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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between antitrust policy and information was
traditionally concerned with oral or written communications that had
anticompetitive potential, mainly because they furthered collusion or
market exclusion.1 Among the most difficult problems was interpreting
* This Article was prepared as the basis for the 2016 Dunwody Distinguished Lecture in
Law at the Fredric G. Levin College of Law, University of Florida, on April 8, 2016.
** Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor, Law and History, University of Iowa.
1. See, e.g., Associated Container Transp. (Austl.) Ltd. v. United States, 705 F.2d 53, 55–
56 (2d Cir. 1983) (focusing on communications between companies accused of exclusionary
tactics).
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the significance of communications that could be construed as either
threats or offers to collude, or as facilitators of collusion.2 On the one
hand, markets profit greatly from the free flow of information. 3 On the
other, particular uses of information threaten competition when they
enable firms to coordinate price, output, or innovation.4
Of course, explicit price fixing is a use of information but so are
various cartel-facilitating practices that depend on publicizing one’s price
or output. As a result, the way information is communicated has been a
factor in merger analysis, particularly when the fear is that the merger
might facilitate collusion.5 A recent example of this concern is In re
LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation,6 which
includes claims that banks used misreporting about interest rates as a
device for manipulating them.7 U.S. courts have also confronted
complaints that companies were exchanging wage and salary information
to suppress or fix wages at an artificially high level. Individuals from
numerous industries have made such claims, ranging from petroleum
geologists,8 to high technology Silicon Valley employees, 9 to law
professors.10
Prior to the 1980s, “information” in antitrust enforcement meant
mainly print media, radio, television, film, and audio recording. All were
involved in antitrust disputes at one time or another, and the challenged
practices ran the entire gamut of U.S. antitrust law—from vertical
integration and exclusion in the 1948 United States v. Paramount

2. See 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 1417–1419 (on
communications among competing sellers and offers to collude); William H. Page,
Communication and Concerted Action, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 405 (2007) (similar).
3. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets, 28 J. CORP.
L. 607, 607 (2003).
4. See 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2020 (3d ed. 2012) (describing price
fixing and related practices); LOUIS KAPLOW, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE FIXING 219, 221
(2013); Page, supra note 2, at 412; William H. Page, The Gary Dinners and the Meaning of
Concerted Action, 62 SMU L. REV. 597, 607–10 (2009).
5. 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 914, 942–944 (4th
ed. 2016) (forthcoming).
6. 935 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
7. Id. at 679.
8. Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2001), cause transferred by In re
Comp. of Managerial, Prof’l & Tech. Emps. Antitrust Litig., 206 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (J.P.M.L.
2002).
9. In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1108–09 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
10. United States v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 934 F. Supp. 435, 436 (D.D.C. 1996), modified, 135 F.
Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2001), and modified, No. 95-1211, 2001 WL 514376 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2001)
(settling an antitrust case against the American Bar Association for tying law school accreditation
to faculty salaries).
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Pictures, Inc.11 case, to unilateral refusal to deal in Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States,12 to a series of newspaper mergers and the passage of the
Newspaper Preservation Act in 1970 to protect newspaper production
joint ventures.13 In Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,14 the
Supreme Court refused to condemn a government-challenged tying
arrangement in the newspaper publishing industry, exonerating a New
Orleans newspaper publishing company’s practice of requiring that the
same classified advertisements be run in its morning and evening
editions.15 Finally, the Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc.16 decision rejected an antitrust challenge and, in the process,
acknowledged the value of nonexclusive, blanket copyright licenses for
recorded music.17
Information also plays an important role in competition policy in the
regulated industries, mainly because agencies depend on accurate
information typically supplied by the regulated firms. As a result,
misreporting one’s own market position can serve to exclude a rival or
become a device for collusion.18 Or, in patent law, exaggerated claims
about the validity or strength of one’s own patents can become a potent
exclusion device.19
All of these issues concerning the relationship between competition
policy and information remain today. Many are more important than ever
given the ubiquity of information and the speed at which it travels.
This Article considers a related but nevertheless distinct issue: the
relationship between competition policy and the technologies of
information. Technological change can both facilitate and undermine the
use of information for anticompetitive practices.20 The effects are
11. 334 U.S. 131, 137 (1948).
12. 342 U.S. 143, 148, 155 (1951).
13. E.g., Mich. Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1286–87 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (interpreting the Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1804 (2012)); see
also 1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 251e (4th ed. 2013)
(discussing the Newspaper Preservation Act as an antitrust exemption).
14. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
15. Id. at 596–97, 627.
16. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
17. Id. at 22–25.
18. See Kottle v. Nw. Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1058–59 (9th Cir. 1998) (granting
Noerr-Pennington immunity to health-care provider who allegedly provided false information to
authority to induce its refusal to permit another firm to enter the market).
19. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177
(1965); Transweb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Properties Co., 812 F.3d 1295, 1306–12 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (applying Walker Process).
20. See, e.g., Rachel Aridor-Hershkovitz, Antitrust Law—A Stranger in the Wikinomics
World? Regulating Anti-Competitive Use of the DRM/DMCA Regime, 27 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 2–6 (2009) (discussing technological regime changes in digital rights
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heavily, although not exclusively, a result of digitization and the many
products and processes that it enables.21 Further, information
technologies account for a significant portion of the difficulties that
antitrust law encounters when it addresses intellectual property (IP)
rights.22 In addition, changes in the technologies of information affect the
structures of certain products, in the process either increasing or
decreasing the potential for competitive harm.23 Of particular importance
here are the measurement of market power in heavily digital
technologies; the changing role of consumer choice in digital markets,
focusing here on the Google Search investigation; the impact of
digitization on the opportunities for collusion, focusing on the Apple
eBooks antitrust case; the role of the antitrust laws in facilitating net
neutrality or other conceptions of internet competition; and the role of
information in antitrust evaluation of patent practices, particularly those
pertaining to FRAND licensing in markets subject to standard setting, and
patent pools.
I. DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND MARKET POWER
The principal feature distinguishing antitrust from other legal controls
of improper business conduct is that antitrust is concerned with practices
that threaten the exercise of “market power,” or the power to profit by
reducing output below the competitive level, thereby increasing the
price.24 If a firm without power reduces its output, others will quickly
make up the output loss, and price will be unaffected.25 So to have market
copyright law leading to anticompetitive practices).
21. See id. at 2.
22. Dana R. Wagner, The Keepers of the Gates: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and the
Regulatory Implications of Systems Technology, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 1073, 1073–76 (2000).
23. E.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1066–67 (10th Cir. 2013)
(software), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1947 (2014); Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 956, 958
(9th Cir. 2013) (digital music plus devices); Lavoho, LLC v. Apple, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 3d 395, 396
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (eBooks); Meredith Corp. v. SESAC LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 180, 186 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (licensed television programming); Comput. Automation Sys., Inc. v. Intelutions, 998 F.
Supp. 2d 3, 6–7 (D.P.R. 2014) (software); United States v. Apple, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 263, 266
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (eBooks), aff’d, 787 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2015); Kickflip, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc.,
999 F. Supp. 2d 677, 682 (D. Del. 2013) (social network); Blizzard Entm’t Inc. v. Ceiling Fan
Software LLC, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1006, 1010 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (computer game software); Oracle
Am., Inc. v. CedarCrestone, Inc., 938 F. Supp. 2d 895, 896–97 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (software);
Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (digital books settlement
litigation); TradeComet.com LLC v. Google Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 370, 372–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(search engine advertising), aff’d in part, 647 F.3d 472 (2d Cir. 2011), and aff’d in part, 435 Fed.
Appx. 31 (2d Cir. 2011).
24. See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW, ANTITRUST LAW
¶ 501, at 109 (4th ed. 2014).
25. Id.
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power, a firm (or group of firms acting in concert) must generally be large
enough to remove a sizeable share of output from the market. 26 In
addition, something must restrain rivals or potential rivals from either
entering the market or increasing their own output.27 Fraud, consumer
deception, hard bargaining, and some business torts involving destruction
or disparagement of rivals’ assets can all affect the price of a product.
They are not antitrust violations, however, unless they threaten to
increase or prolong market power. This market power requirement is
essential to most antitrust analysis because so many practices, such as
technology sharing, tying arrangements, agreements to deal exclusively
with a single firm, refusals to deal, and mergers, are socially benign or
beneficial in competitive markets. For these practices, market power is a
necessary, although usually not sufficient, condition for competitive
harm.
Digital technology affects the way firms exercise market power and
also imposes serious measurement difficulties. The digital revolution in
product development and distribution has occurred in stages. The most
extreme is “complete” digital distribution where all of the content shipped
to the consumer is digital.28 Prior to that and continuing to this day, music,
some books, and other media are distributed in formats such as digital
compact disc (CD) or digital video disc (DVD).29 Although most of the
direct user content in such formats is digital, it is still downloaded onto a
physical object, which is then packaged and distributed to consumers
through traditional channels, including brick-and-mortar retailers and the
mail.30 By contrast, complete digital distribution refers to markets such
as those for downloaded songs and downloaded or streamed video
content, including movies, games, and software, as well as electronic
books.31 The entire consumer “package” is distributed purely
electronically. Of course, taking advantage of digital content requires a
device capable of reading and processing it, and a fair amount of litigation
involves these devices or restraints that tie the digital content to these
devices.32
One important consequence of complete product digitization is the
26. Id. at 109–10.
27. Id. ¶ 420, at 73 (describing barriers to entry or competitor mobility).
28. Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 890
(2011).
29. See id. at 890–91, 890 n.1.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 890–91.
32. See, e.g., Tucker v. Apple Comput., Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(rejecting plaintiffs’ challenge to technological tie between Apple music playing devices and
iTunes music database).
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effect on the opportunities firms have to exercise market power.33
Another is the change in the size or shape of the markets in which firms
compete.34 The production and distribution of digital books or other
media is so different from traditional production and distribution in these
markets that most historical analogies fail us. For instance, eBooks
compete everywhere that electronic transmission is available. Further,
they can be transmitted anywhere at nearly no cost, and costs typically do
not vary with transmission distance. This means that the “relevant
antitrust market”35 in which competition occurs is at least nationwide and
perhaps worldwide.36 As a result, local retailers such as bookstores, who
might have a certain amount of power in smaller communities, face
increased competition even though no additional local retailers have
entered the market.
These facts do not necessarily mean that traditional booksellers and
eBook sellers operate in the same antitrust market, however. An antitrust
market, or “relevant market,” is one in which goods are not only
substitutes for one another, and the competition of other sellers is
sufficient to prevent any single firm from increasing its price significantly
by reducing output.37 Each firm’s prices will then remain close to its
costs.38 Determining this is particularly difficult when the two sellers
have very different technologies of distribution, as is the case with
traditional products and completely digital alternatives, even for the same
title. For example, a traditional CD store may be able to compete
effectively with downloaded music only when the latter is priced at a
large markup above its costs.39 If that is the case, then the completely
digital music seller may have significant market power even when
competing traditional sellers are present.
The same thing is true of movies, which can be distributed through
brick-and-mortar theaters, DVDs (either purchased in a store or rented
through the mail), cable television, or internet streaming.40 A casual
observer might see the very same consumers obtaining movies by all of
these means, switching back and forth among them. But it would be
33. See Nicola F. Sharpe & Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Is Apple Playing Fair? Navigating the
iPod Fairplay DRM Controversy, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 332, 332–33, 348–49 (2007).
34. See id. at 332–33.
35. 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 24, ¶ 539, at 317.
36. See, e.g., Lavoho, LLC v. Apple, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 3d 395, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(involving small domestic sellers of ebooks—with foreign purchasers—that claimed injury
resulting from an Apple-orchestrated price-fixing agreement and most-favored-nation clause).
37. See 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 24, ¶ 539, at 317.
38. See id.
39. E.g., In re Dig. Music Antitrust Litig., 812 F. Supp. 2d 390, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
40. Howard Marvel & Kivanc Kirgiz, Recent Antitrust Issues in Distribution of DVDs, 15
ABA SEC. ANTITRUST 9, 9 (2011).
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premature to conclude that they are meaningful antitrust competitors
unless the presence of one of them is sufficient to hold the prices of
another reasonably close to cost. A few decisions have made this error.41
Competition generally drives prices toward short-run marginal cost,
which is the incremental cost of producing one additional unit.42 A
pervasive problem in analyzing power in digital markets is that sellers
typically have a very high ratio of fixed to variable costs.43 This entails
that prices must be considerably above short-run marginal cost to be
profitable,44 lest the firm be unable to recover its fixed costs. For
example, it might cost $10 million to develop the code for Microsoft
Office but only $5 per disc to manufacture and distribute physical copies
on a DVD. If Microsoft competed head-to-head with several makers of
indistinguishable copies, the price would be driven toward $5, and the
firms would be unable to recover their large investment. If Microsoft
streamed the program to users over broadband, distribution costs would
fall to nearly zero.
As a result of these facts, many traditional measures of market power
produce unacceptable false positives.45 These measures include the
Lerner Index and other tools derived from it. Beginning with the
observation that competition drives prices toward marginal cost, the
Lerner Index assesses power by the ratio (P–MC)/P, where P is the
observed price, and MC is the firm’s short-run marginal cost at that
price.46 At a competitive price, which equals marginal cost, the index
reads zero.47 As the degree of market power increases, the index value
approaches one.48 Significantly, however, the Lerner Index is completely
indifferent to fixed costs.49 As a result, an all-digital firm could be
41. See, e.g., Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc., v. Home Video, Inc., 825 F.2d 1559, 1563 (11th
Cir. 1987) (grouping into a single relevant market all movies: theatrical first- or subsequent-run,
video rentals, and cable television); United States v. Syufy Enters., 712 F. Supp. 1386, 1389 (N.D.
Cal. 1989) (finding the contemporary product market to be first- and sub-run motion picture
exhibits, home video, and cable and pay-per-view television), aff’d, 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990).
42. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 700 (1975).
43. E.g., 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 24, ¶ 520, at 216.
44. Id. at 216–17.
45. Daniel A. Crane, Market Power Without Market Definition, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
31, 59–60 (2014).
46. See generally A. P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of
Monopoly Power, 1 REV. ECON. STUD. 157 (1934) (explaining what would come to be known as
the Lerner Index); Herbert Hovenkamp, Response: Markets in IP and Antitrust, 100 GEO. L.J.
2133, 2140–41 (2012).
47. Id.
48. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE §§ 3.1–3.2 (5th ed. 2015).
49. Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 2140.
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charging a price much higher than its marginal cost, thus showing
significant power, but still be going bankrupt because it cannot recover
its fixed costs.
The short-run marginal cost of digital delivery is typically very low,
including any required payment of per use royalties, as well as the trivial
marginal cost of electronic transmission. For example, once the eBook or
digital music file is in place, the cost of selling or streaming an additional
copy is only a little above zero. So in complete digital distribution, where
only the digital content passes from the seller to the buyer, the Lerner
Index reading can create a false impression of substantial market power.
That naturally invites a question: If digital media are sold in
competition with one another, then why is the price not zero or something
very close to zero? That answer lies in the twin effects of IP protection—
namely, per use royalties and product differentiation. A per use royalty is
a variable cost that the seller incurs each time it sells a unit.50 Therefore,
it is part of marginal cost. For example, if the author of an eBook is
entitled to one dollar on each copy sold, then the cost of distribution must
be at least one dollar per copy. By contrast, lump sum royalties, which
are a single royalty on a product over its entire commercial life, 51 do not
show up in marginal costs. For example, if a person sells a story to a
digital magazine for $2,000 and that is the only revenue expectation from
this story, then that $2,000 is a fixed cost to the magazine and does not
affect marginal costs. It pays no more in royalties when it sells an
additional copy. That is also the case for many academic authors who
may not receive any royalty for their scientific or technical articles. Once
again, the marginal cost of electronic distribution is practically zero.
Nonetheless, articles in digitized academic journals for which the
authors receive no royalties are hardly priced at zero. In fact, they can be
very expensive.52 This is true because IP rights also create product
differentiation, which blunts the impact of competition quite
considerably, even when there are no royalties. For example, Amazon at
this writing (April 2016) lists more than 281 Kindle electronic Italian
cookbooks, ranging in price from zero to twenty-five dollars.53 Books that
50. See Christopher B. Seaman, Ongoing Royalties in Patent Cases After eBay: An
Empirical Assessment and Proposed Framework, 23 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 203, 225 (2015).
51. Id. at 223–24.
52. See, e.g., Aaron S. Edlin & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Exclusion or Efficient Pricing? The
“Big Deal” Bundling of Academic Journals, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 119, 154–55 (2004); see also
DANIELLE JURSKI & BRIDGET LAMB, STUDY OF SUBSCRIPTION PRICES FOR SCHOLARLY SOCIETY
JOURNALS: SOCIETY JOURNAL PRICING TRENDS AND INDUSTRY OVERVIEW 2–4 (Allen Press, 2015),
http://allenpress.com/system/files/pdfs/library/2015_Allen_Press_Study_of_Subscription_Prices
.pdf (showing that many publishers have increased prices at a steady rate since 2011).
53. AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com (select “Kindle Store” in search options; then
search “Italian cookbook”) (displaying a list of Italian cookbooks available for under twenty-five
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are still under copyright cannot be precise copies of one another. Unless
licensed, the second of two identical books would infringe the copyright
on the first. To the extent that they differ, however, customers have
preferences for one over another, and this permits prices at above cost
even though the market has multiple competitors.54
The market for digital distribution of books for which the copyright
has expired demonstrates the impact of legally enforceable copyright
protection. Typically, these are books that were originally copyrighted in
the United States before 1923. Entry into the public domain not only
makes royalties unnecessary, but it also permits head-to-head
competition between undifferentiated versions of a product. For example,
the above-referenced Italian cookbook on Amazon with a price of zero
was published in 1919, so it is in the public domain.55 The price of a fully
digital edition of Moby Dick (originally published in 1851)—a public
domain famous book—is also zero on several websites, including
Amazon,56 Gutenberg,57 Google Books (several editions),58 and
Hathitrust (also several editions).59 In this case, sellers do not need to pay
a license fee, and different sellers can offer identical text without fear of
copyright infringement. Stores such as Barnes & Noble also sell Moby
Dick in unlicensed, public domain hard-copy editions. There the price is
positive,60 however, reflecting the positive costs of individual book
production and distribution. Finally, one element of product
differentiation that can produce positive prices even on public domain
digital content is format specificity. If an electronic file format is specific
to a device, then a firm may be able to charge a positive price to owners
of that device.61
When traditional antitrust tools measure market power, firms with
high fixed costs appear to have significant amounts of it.62 This problem
is not limited to the Lerner Index. None of the antitrust tools for assessing
dollars).
54. EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 56 (1933); Drew
Fudenberg & J. Miguel Villas-Boas, Price Discrimination in the Digital Economy, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 254 (Martin Peitz & Joel Waldfogel eds., 2012).
55. See AMAZON, http://amazon.com (select “Kindle Store” in search options; then search
Maria Gentile, “The Italian Cook Book The Art of Eating Well”) (displaying a price of zero).
56. See AMAZON, http://amazon.com (select “Kindle Store” in search options; then search
“Moby Dick”) (displaying a price of zero).
57. GUTENBERG, https://www.gutenberg.org (search book catalog field for “Moby Dick”).
58. GOOGLE BOOKS, https://books.google.com (search in search bar for “Moby Dick”).
59. HATHITRUST, https://www.hathitrust.org (search in search bar for “Moby Dick”).
60. BARNES & NOBLE, http://barnesandnoble.com (search in search bar for “Moby Dick”)
(listing multiple editions for a range of positive prices, including $8.60 for a paperback edition).
61. For a discussion of standard setting, see infra Section V.A.
62. Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 2140–41.
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power is particularly sensitive to the presence of fixed costs.63 Even
traditional product and geographic market definitions consider how firms
respond to greater or lesser competition within a certain product or
geographic range and over a relatively short period of time.64 For
example, a court might assess an antitrust market by considering the price
responses that occur when a new pizza restaurant comes into a
community that previously had only one or the amount by which one firm
lowers its price in response to a perceived competitor’s price cut. But
these short-run responses generally assume fixed-cost assets that are
already in place, so most of the responses, such as lowering one’s price
when new entry occurs, consider mainly variable costs. Courts generally
do not consider previous investment in such things as research and
development.65
Antitrust should not draw an inference of substantial market power
unless returns over a fairly long run are excessive. Often purely digital
products are sold in competitive, product-differentiated markets. For
example, the market for “apps” for electronic calculators or notepads that
can run on a device such as an iPad often shows competition among
numerous suppliers.66 These markets are simultaneously competitive but
may also exhibit high price–cost margins if courts only consider the short
run.67 Product differentiation largely explains prices above marginal cost
as well as differences in pricing.
A single firm’s inability to earn high returns over the long run does
not preclude the exercise of market power. It does mean, however, that
participating firms must exercise market power collaboratively rather
than unilaterally.68 For example, a combination of high fixed costs plus
low variable costs, as in the “app” example,69 creates inducements for
price fixing or in some cases for market division, which occurs when two
or more sellers can slice the market into pieces, giving each seller an
63. See id.
64. See Philip Nelson, Monopoly Power, Market Definition, and the Cellophane Fallacy,
ECONOMISTS INC., http://www.justice.gov/atr/monopoly-power-market-definition-and-cellophanefallacy (last updated June 25, 2015).
65. The government’s 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines account for this by
distinguishing “rapid entrants” in response to a price increase from other entrants. An entrant is
“rapid” if it need not incur significant sunk or fixed costs to migrate into the price-affected market.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 5.1
(2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html.
66. See Gideon Kimbrell, Five Killer Marketing and Distribution Strategies for Your App,
FORBES (July 18, 2014, 9:11 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2014/07/18/five-killermarketing-and-distribution-strategies-for-your-app/.
67. See Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 2140.
68. See 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 2000, at 7.
69. 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 24, ¶ 520, at 216.
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exclusive right in each piece.70 Both price fixing and market division can
reduce market-wide output and increase the prices of the product in
question, but only if the participating firms collectively hold market
power.71 If a cartel of firms lacking any power (such as a group of ten
tomato growers in a market of 10,000) attempted to raise prices, they
would simply lose all their sales.
While high fixed costs might explain why a cartel occurs, they
certainly do not justify it. One reason is that product differentiation is
typically sufficient to produce above-cost returns even when fixed costs
are high.72 The real concern is markets with high fixed costs whose output
cannot be differentiated.
Another reason for not tolerating price fixing in markets with high
fixed costs is that colluding firms will charge the monopoly (or cartel)
price, not the minimum profitable price.73 The full monopoly price in a
market could be much higher than the minimum price necessary to
sustain production and thus represents a significant wealth transfer away
from consumers74 as well as inefficiency losses from lower output.75
Courts can assess naked price fixing and market division under
antitrust’s per se rule without an inquiry into market power.76 That still
leaves the problem of unilateral conduct or collaborative activities that
have efficiency-creating potential, which courts traditionally assess under
the rule of reason. This requires an assessment of market power,
regardless of whether it is difficult to accomplish.
In its recent Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc.77 decision,
which involved competition between name-brand and bioequivalent
generic pharmaceutical drugs, 78 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
courts could infer market power from a large “pay-for-delay”
settlement from a branded drug maker to a generic. 79 Under that
agreement, the generic firm would stay out of the market for a
70. 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 2000, at 6.
71. See id.¶ 2000, at 7.
72. 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 24, ¶ 520, at 219.
73. See 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 2001a, at 8–9.
74. See William H. Page, A Neo-Chicago Approach to Concerted Action, 78 ANTITRUST
L.J. 173, 175–76 (2012).
75. See Jonathan B. Baker, Preserving a Political Bargain: The Political Economy of the
Non-interventionist Challenge to Monopolization Enforcement, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 605, 605
(2010).
76. See 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 2004, at 68.
77. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
78. Id. at 2224–25.
79. Id. at 2236–37 (referring to the settlement as a “reverse payment”); Aaron Edlin, Scott
Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, The Actavis Inference: Theory and Practice, 67
RUTGERS L. REV. 585, 586 (2015).
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specified term in exchange for the pioneer’s payment, often in the
hundreds of millions of dollars. 80 The high pay-for-delay settlement
indicates power because it shows that the payer has volume and
margins worth protecting. 81 To be sure, the payer’s output may reflect
the power of a valid patent, but the patent validity question should not
be confused with the power question. Further, even if a patent is
perfectly valid, a horizontal price-fixing or market-division agreement
is not justified for the same reason noted above—it tends to equate the
value of the patent with the full monopoly or cartel value of the
market.82
As Actavis suggests, in some cases one can estimate market power
from behavior, and these estimates can be more reliable than estimates
taken from information about price–cost relationships.83 Just like digital
technology, pharmaceuticals are a market where high price–cost margins
are poor indicators of power because they do not pick up development
costs, which are significant but incurred up front, mainly prior to
production.84 Production costs are low, and margins are consequently
very high. As a result, prices often drop dramatically when a chemically
identical generic competitor enters the market. This is most dramatic
when two or more generic equivalents enter a market previously occupied
by only a single pioneer drug manufacturer.85 These differences between
price and short-run cost are not as extreme as for purely digital
technologies, but they are substantial nonetheless.
An important message of Actavis is that courts can infer market power
from other criteria than market definition or price–cost relationships in
circumstances where this more traditional evidence is not very helpful.
Behaviors such as making large payments to keep someone out of one’s
market are rational acts only on the premise that a firm has significant
power.86 Courts should look more closely at these nontraditional
mechanisms for evaluating power, including the ability to impose
onerous terms on others.
80. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2225.
81. See id. at 2236; 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 24, ¶ 520, at 215–16.
82. See 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 24, ¶ 520, at 216–17; Crane, supra
note 45, at 54.
83. See id.; Crane, supra note 45, at 77.
84. See M. Howard Morse, Product Market Definition in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 633, 674–75 (2003); see also Crane, supra note 45, at 57 (explaining that the
Lerner Index is misaligned in the pharmaceutical context, “where large fixed investments in
research and development (R&D) are necessary to the creation of new technologies”).
85. See Edlin et al., supra note 79, at 607; Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent
Settlements and the Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 3, 9–10
(2014).
86. 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 24, ¶ 520, at 214.
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Another common feature of digital markets is networks, which also
create complexities for assessing market power. Networked markets are
frequently “two-sided” or multi-sided. This means that transactions move
along more than a single avenue between buyers and the seller.87 The
seller in a two-sided market faces two or more groups of buyers that can
either compete with or complement one another.88
For example, credit card companies must compete for both merchant
acceptance and card users, and a practice that enlarges one side might
either enlarge or diminish the other side. Too high a price to merchants
will reduce their number, and this in turn will make the card less valuable
to users. Therefore, to determine the optimal price to merchants, the card
issuer must consider the impact on card users as well. Subscription
magazines also earn revenue from both subscribers and advertisers. The
advertisers are willing to pay more as the subscription audience grows,
and these higher payments reduce the magazine’s revenue needs from
consumers. For their part, consumers might welcome lower magazine
prices but also might resist excessive advertising. To earn a profit, the
magazine must optimize across these two groups together.89 In some
cases, the optimal price to one group is zero.90 In traditional television
antenna markets as well as non-satellite AM and FM radio, for example,
consumers watch or listen for free, and the stations earn their revenue
completely from advertisers. A bigger audience increases advertising
revenue, but at least some members of the audience may switch channels
if they hear more advertising than they want. A similar situation occurs
in large internet search engines, such as Google Search, which is largely
free to users but financed by advertising.91
Multi-sided markets are a common feature of digital networks. A
variety of digital websites such as news magazines, music servers, and
some games are free to users and supported by advertising.92 Other digital
websites, including Spotify or Pandora, come in both a free version that
87. David S. Evans, Governing Bad Behavior by Users of Multi-sided Platforms, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1201, 1203 (2012).
88. See id. at 1203–04; see also Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher R. Leslie, The Firm as
Cartel Manager, 64 VAND. L. REV. 813, 867–70 (2011) (providing the example of MasterCard
and Visa).
89. See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1
J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990, 990 (2003).
90. See Geoffrey G. Parker & Marshall W. Van Alstyne, Two-Sided Network Effects: A
Theory of Information Product Design, 51 MGMT. SCI. 1494, 1496–97, 1503 (2005).
91. See Peter T. Barbur, Kyle W. Mach & Jonathan J. Clarke, Market Definition in Complex
Internet Markets, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 285, 290 (2011).
92. See, e.g., David S. Evans, Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet
Economy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1987, 1992 (2008) (noting that many internet businesses offer free
content by generating revenue primarily from advertisers).
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advertising largely supports and also a premium version for which the
users pay and the provider removes or severely limits advertising.93
Looking only at the listener market, one might see a form of price
discrimination intended to capture both high-demand premium and lowdemand free customers. But price discrimination involves selling at
different ratios of price to cost. Before measuring these ratios, one must
know the revenue from both customer use and advertising. Conceivably,
the platform operator earns more from its “free” advertising-supported
customers than from its paid customers.
Measuring market power in multi-sided markets poses special
difficulties because of “feedback” effects that occur when a price change
in one side affects size and revenue on a different side. Looking at one
side alone, there is no necessary relationship between price and marginal
cost, and even a consumer price of zero may be a component in a perfectly
rational and competitive business strategy.94 Assessing market power
often requires looking at all sides of the market together. For example, it
would be incorrect to conclude that an advertising-sponsored internet
music site lacked power because its price to subscribers is zero. It would
also be incorrect to conclude that a magazine has substantial market
power because a significant change in the subscription price would not
lead to a profit-defeating reduction in subscribers. The loss of revenue
from subscribers would have to be added to any loss of advertising
revenue that results from a lower subscription base.95
Market multi-sidedness can make traditional market share measures
much less valuable as well. By charging a price of zero, for example, a
seller might acquire an enormous share of the audience market for its
particular product. However, its share of the advertising market in which
it actually earns its revenue might be very small. Further, the advertising
market and the audience market might have very different boundaries.
For example, a magazine about sports fishing might appeal mainly to
people whose hobby is fishing, but it might attract advertisers from a
number of different markets that do not compete with one another,
including fishing equipment, travel agencies, airlines, resort rentals,
boats, outdoor clothing, and the like. These advertisers might advertise in
a wide variety of markets related to sports and leisure but hardly limited
to fishing.
93. Spotify v. Pandora, DIFFEN, http://www.diffen.com/difference/Pandora_vs_Spotify
(last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
94. E.g., Wallace v. IBM Corp., 467 F.3d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 2006) (not unlawful
predatory pricing for IBM to charge a price of zero for its open source operating system when
attached to computer hardware).
95. See Jith Jayaratne & Janusz A. Ordover, Economics and Competition Policy: A TwoSided Market?, ANTITRUST, Fall 2012, at 78, 79–80.
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These problems are further exacerbated by the fact that in most multisided platform markets, fixed costs are high, which limits the use of
price–cost margins to assess power.96 These complexities have led to the
criticism that antitrust agencies often ignore multi-sidedness and consider
power by focusing their attention excessively or exclusively on one side
of the market alone.97 Countering this is the fact that whether a practice
is unreasonably exclusionary is often a consequence of market share or
dominance. Moreover, a firm that is dominant in one side of a multi-sided
market can often exclude rivals anticompetitively.
All of these factors serve as a warning that assessment of market
power is extremely difficult in markets characterized by very low variable
costs, IP rights, networking, multi-sidedness, or some combination of
these things. Not uncommonly, networked digital markets exhibit all of
them.98 Power evaluations in these situations are at significant risk of
false positives or false negatives if the market is not fully understood.
Further, answers may differ depending on the question. Suppose that
there are twenty note-taking “apps” available for the iPad or other Apple
devices. Each one of these, assuming it is not free, sells at a price
considerably above short-run marginal cost. This latter fact, standing
alone, should not establish a monopoly power requirement for an
exclusionary practice. It is also necessary to determine just how the
defendant app manufacturer’s practice will result in market-wide (as
opposed to individual) exclusion as well as the likelihood that such
exclusion will occur. At the same time, however, there is no need to
hesitate to condemn price fixing or naked market division among these
same manufacturers.
Finally, as noted previously, in purely digital markets, IP rights are
almost always crucial to the exercise of significant market power.99 The
principal IP right relevant here is copyright, although trademark rights
and occasionally patents may have importance as well. Once a book such
as Moby Dick enters the public domain, it can be very cheaply copied,
and digitization reduces inventory and distribution costs to practically
nothing.100 Therefore, even explicit price fixing is not likely to maintain
prices above cost for extended periods of time. If an anticompetitive
restraint should occur, it would not be in the public domain product itself,
96. Id. at 79.
97. See David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE
J. ON REG. 325, 328–29, 345 (2003).
98. See 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 24, ¶ 520, at 216; William J. Baer
& David A. Balto, Antitrust Enforcement and High-Technology Markets, 5 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 73, 75–76 (1999).
99. See supra notes 42–51 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 49–59 and accompanying text.
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although it could be in the hardware or infrastructure necessary for
distributing such content. What makes collusion in digital media
profitable is copyright protection, which permits cartel members to
charge a higher price without losing excessive sales to outsiders.101
These observations should highlight one feature of digital markets that
has been the focus of substantial antitrust litigation—namely, the
“product” that consumers want is frequently only the tail, while the
delivery device is the dog. For example, the major bottlenecks in the
eBook and eMusic industries have not been the books or songs
themselves, which are rarely capable of being monopolized, but rather
technological constraints on reading or listening devices and the file
formats that they run. In the ongoing Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust
Litigation,102 the plaintiffs claim that Apple strategically manipulated
hardware configurations and file formats to maintain incompatibility with
non-Apple systems, thus locking customers into a single technology and
set of Apple devices.103 In these situations, the enemy of competition is
incompatibility, or lack of portability, across platforms. The discussion
below of antitrust policy and Google Search illustrates the sometimes
unappreciated importance of portability.
II. DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES AND CONSUMER CHOICE: GOOGLE SEARCH
The other side of the market power coin is consumer choice. One
consequence of the simultaneous revolutions in telecommunications and
digital technology is that consumers have never faced a wider array of
choices, and the cost of switching among alternative products has never
been lower.104
Here, an important factor is the degree of dependence between
dedicated hardware and compatible digital choices.105 While purely
digital systems are or can be highly portable across different platforms,
hardware is often much less so.106 Consider the differences between the
Microsoft/Windows cases from more than a decade ago and the Google
Search cases, now likely concluded in the United States but ongoing in
101. See David McGowan, Networks and Intention in Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 24
J. CORP. L. 485, 486 (1999).
102. No. 05-CV-0037 YGR, 2014 WL 4809288 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2014).
103. Id. at *2. At this writing, this case had been tried and resulted in a jury verdict for
defendant Apple. Verdict Form at 2, Apple iPod, No. 05-CV-0037.
104. See Adam Candeub, Behavioral Economics, Internet Search, and Antitrust, 9 I/S: J.L.
& POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 407, 409 (2014); Aaron S. Edlin & Robert G. Harris, The Role of
Switching Costs in Antitrust Analysis: A Comparison of Microsoft and Google, 15 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 169, 172–73, 177 (2013); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Movement of Technology,
19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1119, 1120 (2012).
105. See Edlin & Harris, supra note 104, at 178.
106. See id. at 193–94.
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Europe.107 Microsoft was able to exploit a high degree of dedication
between computer hardware—so called “IBM-compatible” or Intelbased computer stations—and the Windows operating systems.108 A
business that operated 300 Windows computers could switch to the Apple
operating system only by switching out its computers. This would be
extraordinarily costly, not only because of the computers themselves but
also because of the training of employees, the replacement of a great deal
of application software, and so on.109
The Google Search cases present a sharp contrast. The U.S. and EU
investigations into Google Search should be regarded skeptically,
notwithstanding Google’s high search market share in Europe.110 Most
search engines are multi-platform products that run equally well on all of
the most popular platforms, which include Windows, Apple, and Android
devices. To be sure, Google may be the default or preinstalled search
engine on Android mobile phones and some others, but consumers can
generally install alternative search engines. Microsoft makes its own
search engine, Bing, which is generally the default search engine
accompanying Microsoft operating systems.111 The story for desktop and
laptop computers is even simpler from the consumers’ perspective.
Consumers can install any of the more popular search engines, of which
there are many, almost instantaneously and at no charge. Not
uncommonly, computer users have several search engines available. Any
time they are unhappy with the results of one engine’s search, they can
turn to another one.
Here, high market share should not be confused with monopoly. The
latter requires the ability to hold prices above the competitive level or
provide an inferior service even while retaining one’s own dominant
market share.112 As a result, competition policy makers should be wary
of technological locks that make it difficult for consumers to switch to a
different search engine. Having done that, the concern about the content
107. Id. at 171–74.
108. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Edlin & Harris,
supra note 104, at 185–86. For an excellent discussion of these cases, see generally ANDREW I.
GAVIL & HARRY FIRST, THE MICROSOFT ANTITRUST CASES: COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2015).
109. For an excellent study, see ANDREW I. GAVIL & HARRY FIRST, THE MICROSOFT
ANTITRUST CASES: COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2015).
110. See Matt Rosoff, Here’s How Dominant Google Is in Europe, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 29,
2014, 2:38 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-how-dominant-google-is-in-europe2014-11 (providing graphics on search engine market share).
111. E.g., Sam Mattera, Microsoft Is Trying to Keep You off Chrome and Firefox, MOTLEY
FOOL (Sept. 20, 2015, 6:00 PM), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/09/20/microsoftis-trying-to-keep-you-off-chrome-and-fir.aspx.
112. See Matthew K. Finkelstein & Colleen Lagan, Note, “Not For You”; Only for
Ticketmaster: Do Ticketmaster’s Exclusive Agreements with Concert Venues Violate Federal
Antitrust Law?, 10 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 403, 415 (1995).
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of a particular search becomes far less important.
To be sure, deception is a problem. Most deception has nothing to do
with monopoly, however, and consumer protection or tort law best
addresses the problem. For a durable monopoly to exist, consumers must
pay too much (or obtain too little) and be helpless to do anything about
it. By contrast, the best cure for deception is to enjoin or penalize it. For
example, there is far less reason for concern about a Google search result
that favors its own asset, such as YouTube, a Google subsidiary, if
searchers (1) know about the ownership interest and (2) have easy access
to alternative search engines. If Google persistently favors its own assets
in a way that harmed consumers, then consumers can readily and without
cost switch to a different search engine. The best way to address this
problem is informational: requiring Google to inform consumers when
favored sites are located more prominently in search results. “Favored”
in this context means either assets that Google owns or where Google has
accepted compensation for high placement. Beyond that, management of
search algorithms is best left to the market.
This suggests that the competition law authorities should focus on
ensuring that every platform from which search engines are launched,
including mobile platforms, have adequate alternatives available to which
reasonably well-informed customers can easily switch. If a more forceful
behavioral approach is necessary, managing the default search engine is
a much simpler solution than managing the search algorithm. Further, as
one episode suggests, it is likely to be effective. Early in 2015, Firefox,
the third-most popular web browser worldwide and in the United
States,113 shifted its default search engine from Google to Yahoo.114 Soon
after, Google’s share of all U.S. search dropped from 77.3% to 75.2%,
while Yahoo’s increased from 8.6% to 10.6%.115 Interestingly, Microsoft
Bing, which was not involved in the change of the default search engine,
was unaffected.116 Looking only at Firefox users, Google’s share of
search fell from 86.1% to 60.8%, while Yahoo’s increased from 7.5% to

113. For ongoing statistics on browser market share, see generally STATCOUNTER,
https://statcounter.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
114. Nicole Arce, Here’s Why Firefox Dumped Google and Made Yahoo! Its Default Search
Engine, TECH TIMES (Nov. 22, 2014, 4:55 AM), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/20602/
20141122/heres-why-firefox-dumped-google-and-make-yahoo-its-default-search-engine.htm.
115. Liam Tung, Google’s US Desktop Search Share Dips After Yahoo-Firefox Tie Up, ZD
NET (Jan. 8, 2014, 11:41 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/googles-us-desktop-search-sharedips-after-yahoo-firefox-tie-up/.
116. See id. A different report showed even larger market share shifts on Firefox browser
users. See Gregg Keizer, Yahoo’s U.S. Share on Firefox Quadruples After Deal,
COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 8, 2015, 3:02 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2866429/
yahoos-us-share-on-firefox-quadruples-after-deal.html.
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32.2%.117 This data suggests that the choice of a default search engine
can have an impact on market share, although at this writing it is too early
to say how significant or durable these changes will be. Managing search
engine defaults would be a far more tractable approach to this
competition problem than any attempt to micromanage the Google search
algorithm, which will almost certainly require ongoing supervision,
effectively turning Google Search into a public utility. A simple order
could prevent the sale of devices with a default search engine and instead
require users to select a default.
Of course, as one journalist pointed out, customers who use the
Firefox browser with Yahoo as the default search engine can always
switch back, and some of them have.118 Nevertheless, the market share
response to a switch in the default search engine means a great deal for
competition policy analysis. If Google is in fact a monopolist, why would
someone switch back to it? Assuming that they are not constrained to do
so, the explanation is that they prefer Google Search for some reason. In
that case, antitrust has no business interfering.
III. DIGITIZATION, COST STRUCTURE, AND COLLUSION: THE EBOOKS
ANTITRUST CASE
In re Electronic Books Antitrust Litigation119 is a challenge to
collusive behavior born in the United States but later expanded to Europe
and elsewhere. Apple facilitated the creation of a cartel of book
publishers that not only increased the price of electronic books but also
imposed pricing rules in the form of most-favored-nation clauses on
Apple’s competitor, Amazon.120 Here, the most-favored-nation clause
was a contractual provision that required the publishers to charge a price
for electronic books sold through Apple’s rivals, principally Amazon, to
be at least as high as the prices charged through Apple’s own electronic
book store.121 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit later
117. Keizer, supra note 116.
118. See Robert Hof, Why Google’s Search Markets Share Loss to Yahoo Means Pretty
Much Nothing, FORBES (Jan. 8, 2015, 6:02 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthof/
2015/01/08/why-googles-search-market-share-loss-to-yahoo-means-pretty-much-nothing/.
119. 859 F. Supp. 2d 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Apple, Inc., 791
F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 2016 WL 854227 (Mar. 07, 2016).
120. Id. at 673–74. On the impact, see Babur De los Santos & Matthijs R. Wildenbeest, EBook Pricing and Vertical Restraints 7 (NET Inst. Working Paper No. 14–18, 2014),
http://www.netinst.org/DelosSantos_14-18.pdf.
121. Apple, 791 F.3d at 304–05 (“[i]f, for any particular New Release in hardcover format,
the . . . Customer Price [in the [Apple] iBookstore] at any time is or becomes higher than a
customer price offered by any other reseller . . . , then [the] Publisher shall designate a new, lower
Customer Price [in the iBookstore] to meet such lower [customer price].” (alterations and
omissions in original) (quoting a most-favored-nation clause in Apple’s contracts with
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affirmed this judgment.122
The technology of eBooks is currently transforming the book market,
with implications that go far beyond this particular price-fixing
agreement. Most significantly, eBooks are rapidly changing the cost
structure of the industry from one that had a nontrivial fixed-cost
component and relatively high variable costs to one in which nearly all
the costs other than royalties and very small distribution costs are fixed.123
For traditional publishing, fixed costs generally refer to the costs of
manuscript acquisitions, editorial staff, typesetting, and at least some
marketing.124 Variable costs include paper and other stock, printing,
cutting, binding, inventory, shipping, and retailer carrying costs.125 The
publishing market has never been particularly problematic for antitrust
enforcers. The market contained numerous small publishers and only
rarely had a dominant firm.126 The total number of sellers and a
substantial amount of product differentiation limited the chances for
collusion. The one exception was local readership newspapers, which
could acquire a dominant position in their geographic markets.127
The book industry does have a long history of resale price
maintenance, which is publisher setting of retail prices. In the United
States, it actually dates back to 1908, before courts even applied the
antitrust laws to the practice. In Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,128 the
Supreme Court refused to enforce a price maintenance clause in a
copyright license agreement.129 However, the vehicle was not
competition policy but rather copyright law’s “first-sale” doctrine.130 The
British “Net Book Agreement,” which largely prevented discounting of
books below the publisher’s announced price, was another example.131
publishers)).
122. Id. at 297.
123. Mark Graban, On Amazon, Publishers, and Book Prices, LEAN BLOG (Aug. 9, 2014),
http://www.leanblog.org/2014/08/on-amazon-publishers-and-book-prices/.
124. R. Anthony Reese, Public but Private: Copyright’s New Unpublished Public Domain,
85 TEX. L. REV. 585, 653 (2007).
125. Id. For data, see Price Charts, GORHAM PRINTING, http://www.gorhamprinting.com/
prices-book-printing/price-charts.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
126. SIC 2731 Book Publishing—Description, Market Prospects, Industry History,
REFERENCE FOR BUS., http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/industries/Printing-PublishingAllied/Book-Publishing.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
127. E.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 146–47 (1951).
128. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
129. Id. at 350; see CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 372 (2012).
130. See Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 350.
131. AMELIA FLETCHER, OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, OFT981, AN EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT
UPON PRODUCTIVITY OF ENDING RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE ON BOOKS 20 (2008),
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/e
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Today, most resale price maintenance is once again legal in the United
States,132 although the European Union and Canada deal with it more
harshly.133
The eBook has drastically changed the cost structure of the book
publishing market. Acquisition, editing costs, and royalties are still
variable, but editing has become less expensive in the age of
computerized text management.134 Once a book has been typeset into an
electronic file, the publisher has spent most fixed costs except for
advertising and promotion.135 Further, while advertising might be
considered a variable cost for some purposes, it is not a cost attached to
each unit sold. In fact, the advertising accompanying an eBook is itself
digitized. No one needs to maintain an inventory of copies other than a
master copy of the digital file. Publishers can make a virtually infinite
number of copies, all at the trivial cost of electronic transmission.
This change in cost structure is having remarkable effects on the book
market, many of which are not yet realized. First, as the Electronic Books
litigation illustrates, it increases the incentive to collude.136 This is true of
many industries with high fixed costs. Competition tends to drive prices
to variable, or marginal, cost without enough remaining to cover fixed
costs. Offsetting this in the book industry is product differentiation: each
title is unique, very likely giving publishers at least some pricing
discretion.
The dramatic rise of the eBook has cut enormously into the sales of
traditional brick-and-mortar bookstores and the national distribution of
physical hard- and soft-copy books.137 Eventually, it may even threaten
the existence of any book retailer who is independent of the publisher,
including giants such as Apple and Amazon. While Apple’s thirty percent
markup has been widely noted, actual markups vary from something less
than that amount to more than 100% for independently published
conomic_research/oft981.pdf; see FREDERICK ORRIDGE MACMILLAN, THE NET BOOK AGREEMENT
1899 AND THE BOOK WAR: 1906–1908, at 1–30 (1924) (recounting the history); Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1019,
1058 n.244 (1989).
132. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007).
133. Bhawna Gulati, Minimum Resale Price Maintenance Agreements—and the Dilemma
Continues, 8 COMPETITION L. REV. 129, 134 (2012).
134. Hean Tat Keh, Evolution of the Book Publishing Industry, 4 J. MGMT. HIST. 104, 105,
111 (1998).
135. William Skidelsky, The True Price of Publishing, GUARDIAN (Aug. 4, 2011, 10:04
AM), http://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2011/aug/04/price-publishing-ebooks.
136. See In re Elec. Books Antitrust Litig., 859 F. Supp. 2d 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d sub
nom. United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 2016 WL 854227
(Mar. 07, 2016).
137. G.D., The Future of the Bookstore: A Real Cliffhanger, ECONOMIST: PROSPERO (Feb.
27, 2013, 7:05 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2013/02/future-bookstore.
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books.138 These markups seem very high in relation to the services
rendered. Publishers need not inventory eBooks, and there is little
concern about returns or losses. As a result, risk is minimal. Most of the
relevant publication and promotional information is in electronic form,
and the publisher supplies this information. To be sure, major retailers
such as Amazon and Apple offer a format for reading the book file, but
the format market is competitive and new ones are being introduced all
the time.139 Many of the larger commercial publishers, such as Penguin
Random House, Hachette, Harper Collins, Simon & Schuster,
Macmillan, Harlequin, as well as the quasi-commercial university
presses, such as Oxford, Harvard, and Cambridge, produce eBooks in a
variety of formats.140 Others, such as Penn Press, tend to favor direct
distribution intended for more generic formats, such as Adobe Digital
Editions or Bluefire Reader.141 Public domain eBooks such as those
published before 1923 in the United States are available in an even wider
variety of file formats.142
The day may come when the dealer intermediary in the book market
becomes superfluous. To survive, intermediaries such as Amazon and
Apple will have to provide sufficient value to publishers to make them
the best choice. Alternatively, they may try to take advantage of market
restraints such as technological incompatibilities or technology ties with
their devices. These restraints might delay migration to more efficient
distribution methods but probably not indefinitely.
There is no good technological or business reason for why publishers,
or perhaps a consortia of publishers, cannot directly distribute eBooks to
an internet site. A system may emerge that is roughly equivalent to the
“blanket license” that governs the distribution of recorded music over
radio stations or other media.143 That is, authors’ books would be
digitized and then placed by nonexclusive license into a massive database
138. See L. Gordon Crovitz, Apple’s 30% E-Book Commission Is 100% Legal, WALL ST. J.
(June 9, 2013, 7:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732384480457853
1433167811270.
139. See Rory Maher, Here’s Why Amazon Will Win the eBook War: Kindle Already Has
90% eBook Market Share, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 13, 2010, 12:38 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-selling-90-of-all-e-books-2010-1
(describing
the
increased competitiveness in the eBook market).
140. See, e.g., Maureen Sullivan, Libraries and Book Publishers, 22 ME. POL’Y REV. 48, 48
(2013).
141. Ebooks from Penn Press, UNIV. OF PA. PRESS, http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/
about/ebooks.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
142. See Sally W. Grotta & Daniel Grotta, E-reader Roundup: 8 Devices Compete for the
Crown, ITWORLD (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.itworld.com/article/2748933/personaltechnology/e-reader-roundup--8-devices-compete-for-the-crown.html.
143. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 22–25 (1979).
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accessible by a website. Readers could then pay for and download
individual titles, which they could then preserve themselves or else have
maintained on a cloud service operated by the website. The website could
offer any number of file formats. The transaction costs associated with
this type of system would be very low. If run by the publishers
themselves, it would eliminate an intermediary’s markup.
While some observers of the book business see a monopoly
equilibrium favoring giant intermediaries such as Amazon,144 the history
of industrial organization and antitrust strongly suggests the contrary.
Two powerful evolutionary, output-increasing phenomena are relevant
here: vertical integration and coalescence around a standard.
Firms integrate vertically when it is profitable, and the main sources
of profit are elimination of costly market transactions, production cost
savings that accrue when a firm performs successive steps internally, and
elimination of double marginalization, or monopoly or cartel pricing in
either an upstream or a downstream market.145 For example, oil refiners
fearful of collusion among gasoline stations may respond by distributing
gasoline directly through wholly owned stations.
A publisher-owned consortium could reduce double-marginalization
problems that arise under third-party distribution, particularly if the
reading device market is competitive. Double marginalization occurs
when firms are in a seller–reseller relationship or provide complementary
products, each firm has a certain amount of market power, and the two
are unable to coordinate their output.146 In that case, each firm maximizes
individually. Final price will be higher and output lower than
otherwise.147 But if the publisher sells its own books directly to
144. E.g., Keith Gessen, The War of the Words, VANITY FAIR (Dec. 2014), http://www.vanity
fair.com/business/2014/12/amazon-hachette-ebook-publishing; Jeremy Greenfield, How the
Amazon-Hachette Fight Could Shape the Future of Ideas, ATLANTIC (May 28, 2014), http://www.the
atlantic.com/business/archive/2014/05/how-the-amazon-hachette-fight-could-shape-the-futureof-ideas/371756; George Packer, Cheap Words: Amazon Is Good for Customers. But Is It Good
for Books?, NEW YORKER (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/02/17/cheap
-words; David Streitfeld, Amazon, a Friendly Giant as Long as It’s Fed, N.Y. TIMES (July 12,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/13/technology/amazon-a-friendly-giant-as-long-as-itsfed.html; Steve Wasserman, When Will the Justice Department Take on Amazon?, NATION (July
16, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/180681/when-will-justice-department-take-amazon.
145. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 48, Ch. 9. On the earlier history of vertical integration in
the United States, discussing these rationales, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND
AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 296–347 (1991). On the later history, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870–1970, at 220–39 (2015)
[hereinafter HOVENKAMP, OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW].
146. De los Santos & Wildenbeest, supra note 120, at 2.
147. On double marginalization in vertical relationships, see 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA AND
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 758 (4th ed. 2015) (forthcoming). On double
marginalization problems arising from third party distribution arrangements in eBooks, see
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consumers, double marginalization is not an issue as to the books, and the
only worry is market power in the device market. As to devices, however,
as long as the hardware device market is competitive or reading apps for
covered file formats are available for zero or little cost, double
marginalization should not be a problem. Today, a variety of readers for
various file formats are available as free downloads.148
In the eBook industry, Amazon’s markups, assuming they are in
excess of distribution costs, provide a classic opportunity for vertical
integration. One attribute of digital distribution is that the costs of vertical
integration are very low, certainly much lower than the cost of building a
nationwide network of gasoline stations or retail stores. To the extent
intermediaries such as Amazon and Apple are charging too high a price
for distribution services, one would expect publishers to integrate
vertically into distribution. Authors and artists as well as consumers
would benefit.
To be sure, traditional booksellers often supply important point-ofsale information in addition to the books themselves. For example, a wellinformed employee in a high-quality bookshop can be a treasure trove of
information. But a proliferation of online sources, including both
professional and readers’ book reviews, has greatly eclipsed that
particular informational service.
As to coalescence around a single standard, one can assume that most
readers want their books conveniently accessible, which means that
readers can access and store them on a single device. Incompatible
devices or file formats can frustrate this, and part of Amazon’s success is
that it has been able to provide a one-stop shop for people’s reading as
well as the largest bookstore, at least for books that are still under
copyright. Even here, however, it has had to make some concessions. For
example, Amazon never been able to attain a significant position in the
device market,149 and just as people want their reading in one place, they
also want other types of computer activities in one place. So Amazon
offers free Kindle reader apps for iPhones and iPads as well as Microsoftbased and Android devices other than Kindle.150 Amazon’s real claim to
Germain Gaudin & Alexander White, On the Antitrust Economics of the Electronic Books
Industry 3 (Dusseldorf Inst. For Competition Econ., Discussion Paper No. 147, 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2352495.
148. For example, ePUB Reader is the most widely supported format. EPUB READER FOR
WINDOWS, http://epub-reader-for-windows.en.softonic.com/download (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
149. Data from 2015 indicate that Apple tablets had a market share of approximately 28%,
while Amazon had a share of about 2.3%. Neil Hughes, Though Apple’s iPad Sales Shrank,
Amazon’s Kindle Fire Took 70% Nosedive Last Quarter, APPLEINSIDER (Feb. 2, 2015, 9:18 AM)
http://appleinsider.com/articles/15/02/02/though-apples-ipad-sales-shrunk-amazons-kindle-firetook-70-nosedive-last-quarter.
150. Free Kindle Reading Apps, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
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control is its proprietary software and eBook format. A reader’s books
are freely transportable to Kindle apps on other devices, but they are not
so easily transportable to non-Kindle software formats.151
One bottleneck to efficient eBook distribution is proprietary
standards. While copyright and perhaps some patents protect file formats,
a wide variety of them are available. The history of most technologies is
that for an initial period, a great deal of incompatibility exists as each
seller attempts to market its own preferred format or distribution system.
In the early days of the automobile, cars burned many types of fuels, and
the early days of videotapes saw a standards war between Sony Betamax
and VHS. Later came high-density digital video, with a competitive fight
between Blu-Ray and HD DVD. Because these various standards are
inefficient, unification tends to occur as the industry matures.152 Today,
a large number of publishers and manufacturers of electronic readers have
coalesced around the EPUB file format.153 While Amazon’s Kindle files
and devices are largely incompatible with EPUB,154 workarounds are
available.155
Movement toward a single standard is likely to happen in the eBook
market as well. The Internet and device market will develop readers that
will cover the new standard and enable consumers to maintain a single
electronic library for books procured from different sources.
Alternatively, conversion will be so easy and foolproof that the market
will be able to accommodate multiple file formats. Whether firms such
as Amazon and Apple will be able to hold out by offering unique features
is difficult to say, but this Article ventures a prediction that in the long
run, theirs will be a losing battle. In particular, why should a large
publishing house continue to pay Amazon a significant commission when
it can self-distribute for much less?

display.html?nodeId=200783640 (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
151. However, conversion programs for Kindle’s AZW file format are generally available
online at no cost. See, e.g., Kevin Pan, How to Convert Kindle AZW to EPUB/PDF/RTF/TXT
Format?, EBOOK-CONVERTER, http://www.ebook-converter.com/69-how-to-convert-kindle-azwother-format.htm (last updated Nov. 30, 2015) (Kindle AZW to epub).
152. See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 129, at 357–63 (recounting the development
of unified standards).
153. See EPUB, INT’L DIG. PUBL’G F., http://idpf.org/epub (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
154. See Nelson Aguilar, How to Add Any eBook Format to Your Kindle Fire HDX,
WONDERHOWTO, http://fire.wonderhowto.com/how-to/add-any-ebook-format-your-kindle-firehdx-0156913/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
155. See, e.g., Derrick Schultz, How to Convert Your ePub to a Kindle Format,
EPUBSECRETS (Apr. 13, 2014), http://epubsecrets.com/convert-epub-to-kindle-mobi-format.php
(last visited Apr. 4, 2016); How to Read ePubs on Kindle Fire, WIKIHOW,
http://www.wikihow.com/Read-ePubs-on-Kindle-Fire (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
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Finally, the plight of the authors is not difficult to understand. As
noted previously, authors’ groups have urged antitrust inquiries into
eBook pricing, particularly by Amazon. For the most part, these authors
presumably have royalty agreements predicated on a percentage of the
sales price, typically in the range of 10% to 20% of the wholesale price.156
Because eBook technology drives variable costs down dramatically,
prices have dropped dramatically as well. So authors are not being injured
because fewer of their books are sold; to the contrary, sales are almost
certainly higher.157 Rather, their injury results from the fact that per-copy
prices are so much lower. This is not an antitrust problem, however, but
rather one in contract drafting. Most particularly, contracts that were
drafted before eBooks were prominently on the scene are now “obsolete,”
in the sense that they provide too little compensation to authors. For
example, if authors’ royalties were a flat rate per copy rather than a
percentage of per-unit prices authors would be better rather than worse
off. In the long run, one can expect that authors will in fact be better off.
Volume will be higher and there will be fewer production costs to be
shared between publishers and authors. The biggest losers will be
traditional intermediaries such as bookstores.
These gains and losses are nothing other than the typical adjustments
to technological change, which benefit some market participants while
injuring others, and in the process can cause painful changes. But authors
very likely have no more of an antitrust claim than gasoline stations will
have when the world switches to electric cars, or blacksmiths had when
it moved away from horse-drawn modes of transportation.
The Second Circuit decision to apply the per se rule158 and condemn
Apple’s solicitation of the publishers to collude against Amazon seems
correct on legal grounds and almost certainly correct on policy grounds
as well. To permit the publishers’ price fixing and boycott agreement
would have slowed up the industry’s movement into a new equilibrium
in which ebooks have a stable position.
As a matter of antitrust law, Apple’s solicitation was a “naked”
restraint, which is one whose success depends on power over price, or the
exercise of market power.159 In this case the publishers’ cartel against
156. For example, the author has book contracts with several publishers, including Aspen,
West Academic, Lexis, Oxford, and Harvard. All of them base royalties on numbers ranging from
10% to 20% of the wholesale net price.
157. See, e.g., Hui Li, Cannibalization or Market Expansion? The Impact of E-Books on
Print Book Sales 3 (Carnegie Mellon Working Paper, Feb. 20, 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2613757 (concluding that 42% of ebook
sales are taken away from traditional books, while 58% result from market expansion).
158. United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 335 (2d. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 2016 WL
854227 (Mar. 07, 2016).
159. See 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1906 (3d ed. 2012).
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Amazon could succeed only by forcing Amazon to raise eBook prices.
Naked restraints are ordinarily governed by antitrust’s per se rule, which
does not require proof of market power. In this case the fact of the
successful restraint itself established power.
A dissenter on the Second Circuit panel did not dispute the facts, but
protested160 that application of the per se rule seemed inconsistent with
dicta in the Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin Creatives Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., where the Court wrote:
A group of retailers might collude to fix prices to consumers
and then compel a manufacturer to aid the unlawful
arrangement with resale price maintenance. In that instance
the manufacturer does not establish the practice to stimulate
services or to promote its brand but to give inefficient
retailers higher profits. Retailers with better distribution
systems and lower cost structures would be prevented from
charging lower prices by the agreement. . . .
A horizontal cartel among competing manufacturers or
competing retailers that decreases output or reduces
competition in order to increase price is, and ought to be, per
se unlawful. To the extent a vertical agreement setting
minimum resale prices is entered upon to facilitate either
type of cartel, it, too, would need to be held unlawful under
the rule of reason.161
These dicta162 apparently contemplated a situation in which a preexisting cartel compelled a manufacturer to participate by imposing RPM
as a cartel-enforcement device. Such a cartel would be contrary to the
manufacturer’s independent interest because the manufacturer would be
best served by a competitive downstream market. Rather, it agrees to
RPM as a condition of keeping the cartelists’ business.
This situation is quite different from the one in Apple, however, where
Apple actually induced the publishers to agree among themselves to
impose higher prices on a different firm that was vertically related to the
publishers but competed with Apple, namely, Amazon.163 That restraint
was intended to facilitate Apple’s entry into the eBook market, but its
efficacy depended on its success in forcing Amazon to charge higher
160. Apple, 791 F.3d at 346 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (citing Leegin Creative Leather Prods.,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 893 (2007)).
161. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893 (internal citations omitted).
162. The statement was dicta because Leegin did not involve a cartel but only an agreement
between a single manufacturer and retailer. Id. at 883. The Court’s discussion of horizontal cartels
was hypothetical, appearing in a discussion of the pro- and anticompetitive effects of resale price
maintenance. Id. at 893–94.
163. Apple, 791 F.3d at 308–09.
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prices.164 As such its profitability depended on its ability to effect a price
increase and is thus a naked restraint that operated horizontally to protect
Apple from Amazon’s lower prices. The Supreme Court noted this
difference in its NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc. decision,165 which observed
that the per se rule was properly applied to a vertically related firm in
Klor’s, where a single retailer allegedly orchestrated a conspiracy among
major appliance manufacturers to boycott a store that competed with the
retailer.166 The per se rule was apt in that case because the manufacturer
was allegedly soliciting the cartel of manufacturers to boycott Klor’s, just
as Apple solicited a cartel of book publishers to force Amazon to raise its
prices.167
IV. NET NEUTRALITY
The term “net neutrality” can mean many things. For some people,
“neutrality” means charging all users the same periodic price, such as
forty dollars per month, regardless of their consumption and the speed
they use. For others, it means charging users in proportion to how much
they use, requiring higher volume or higher speed users to pay more.
Some look at whether different content suppliers, as opposed to viewers,
can obtain more bandwidth, and thus higher speeds for a given amount of
content, by paying more. Others consider whether certain providers are
facing discrimination or are excluded altogether for either economic or
noneconomic reasons.168 Net neutrality can also refer more generally to
guarantees of a certain minimum quality of service for all users. 169 The
questions are further complicated because internet access is a two-sided
market in which internet service providers (ISPs) derive revenue from
both consumers and content providers.170
Net neutrality is not exclusively nor even predominantly an antitrust
problem. Antitrust may become relevant when vertical integration by
ISPs leads to exclusion of or discrimination against competing
downstream content. In the United States, these practices violate the
antitrust laws only infrequently, although they are certainly relevant in
164. Id.
165. 525 U.S. 128 (1998).
166. Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212–13 (1959).
167. Cf. Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 2000) (toy retailer organizing
cartel of toy manufacturers). But see MM Steel, LP v. JSW Steel (USA), Inc., 806 F.3d 835, 849
(5th Cir. 2015) (refusing to interpret Leegin to mandate rule of reason treatment for manufacturers
of steel to participate, and thus to facilitate, a boycott by vertically related steel distributors
directed at a price cutter).
168. See Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and Quality of Service: What a
Nondiscrimination Rule Should Look Like, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7, 16 (2015).
169. See id. at 135.
170. On market two-sidedness, see supra text accompanying notes 87–88.
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merger cases171 and potentially relevant to the law of exclusionary
practices, tying arrangements, or exclusive contracting. EU law sweeps
more broadly, and the European Parliament has recently imposed
significant limitations on the power of providers to discriminate among
types of offerings.172
Net neutrality concerns can become more prominent when old
technology firms such as cable companies attempt to protect their
position by restraining the development of newer technologies like
internet broadband.173 Very likely the biggest long-term concern favoring
government protection of net neutrality is threatened restraints on
innovation.
One issue that dominates the larger debate over net neutrality is that
the Internet has for all practical purposes become a public highway,
reaching deep into people’s daily lives. As a result, concerns analogous
to the “universal service” mandates of public utility policy cannot be
ignored, and these may justify protecting or occasionally even
subsidizing certain portions of the market.174 Fundamentally, however,
these are not antitrust concerns, and antitrust law does not have good tools
for addressing them. To the extent that they are important, a case exists
for government regulation of access and prices that goes beyond antitrust.
The discussion here is limited to antitrust policy, which focuses on
competitive concerns that might result from lack of net neutrality. As an
antitrust matter, the concern over internet distribution is with maintaining
competition, which means a state of affairs that maximizes overall output
and does not unreasonably exclude either ISPs or content providers.175
That is, in the absence of horizontal collusion, the antitrust problem is
fundamentally about bottlenecks.
U.S. antitrust law properly sees competitive problems when a
vertically integrated firm excludes programming that competes with its
own assets. For instance, the ISP Comcast Cable is also the owner of
NBC, a large distributor of programming, including movies. If Comcast
attempted to reduce competition with NBC by placing limits on Netflix,
a major competing streamer of movies and television programming, that
could certainly raise antitrust issues. Such problems are usually handled
171. E.g., Babette E.L. Boliek, FCC Regulation Versus Antitrust: How Net Neutrality Is
Defining the Boundaries, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1627, 1634 (2011).
172. See EU Actions, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/eu-actions
(last updated Oct. 27, 2015).
173. See infra notes 182–93 and accompanying text.
174. Universal Service, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/
universal-service (last visited Apr. 4, 2016) (discussing the extension of “universal service” from
telephone service to the Internet).
175. See van Schewick, supra note 168, at 58.
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preemptively under the law of vertical mergers or, if there is no
contemplated merger, as exclusive contracting or refusal to deal.176 The
problems are most serious when a market contains a dominant ISP.
Pricing is a different matter. Pricing alone does not frequently present
an antitrust problem unless a dominant vertically integrated firm prices
in a way that favors its own assets and reasonable alternatives are
unavailable. First of all, per-unit pricing is typical in similar technologies
such as telephony, electricity, natural gas, and the like. Second, price
discrimination that is unrelated to the exclusion of a competitor typically
increases total output, is usually efficient, and is a virtually inherent
feature in public utility policy.177 As a result, differential pricing to either
users or content providers rarely raises antitrust issues unless the firm
designs pricing so as to exclude a rival or limit its competitive
effectiveness. Society may wish to mandate a particular price
discrimination rule to increase output or meet an articulated universal
service obligation, but this would not be an antitrust rule.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has classified the
Internet as a common carrier, giving the FCC a set of regulatory powers
analogous to those that apply to telephone services.178 The FCC has also
promulgated a set of net neutrality rules whose principal thrust is to
prohibit blocking or the creation of “fast” lanes favoring some content
over others.179 The introduction of these rules has produced a great deal
of overheated rhetoric, including silly claims such as Verizon’s claim that
such regulation is uncalled for because it is based on the 1934
Communications Act and applies regulation approaches designed for the
“steam locomotive and the telegraph.”180 The fact is that the
176. See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, Ch. 14D (3d ed.
2011). For how the concerns might be related to internet discrimination rules, see van Schewick,
supra note 168, at 54–58.
177. See 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 721 (4th ed.
2015); Daniel A. Lyons, Internet Policy’s Next Frontier: Usage-Based Broadband Pricing, 66
FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 22–23 (2013); Christopher Yoo, Is There a Role for Common Carriage in an
Internet-Based World?, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 545, 575–76 (2013).
178. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, GN DOC NO. 14-28, PROTECTING AND PROMOTING THE OPEN
INTERNET 3–4 (2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-24A1.pdf. For
good commentary, see Rob Frieden, Déjà vu All Over Again: Questions and A Few Suggestions
on How the FCC Can Lawfully Regulate Internet Access, 67 FED. COMM. L. J. 325 (2015).
179. In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on Remand,
Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (adopted Feb. 26, 2015),
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2015/db0312/FCC-15-24A1.pdf ). See
generally Lawrence J. Spivak, What Are the Bounds of the FCC’s Authority over Broadband
Service Providers?—A Review of the Recent Case Law, 18 J. INTERNET L. 1 (2015) (discussing
the history and avenues that the FCC could take).
180. Press Release, Verizon, Title II Regulations a ‘Net’ Loss for Innovation and Consumers
(Feb.
26,
2015),
http://publicpolicy.verizon.com/assets/docs/VZ_NR_--_2-26-15_VZ_
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Communications Act, like many federal regulatory provisions, has been
amended many times. The appropriate conception of common carrier
regulation today is far, far different from the 1934 conception, including
a much lighter regulatory touch and increased room for antitrust law as
an alternative.181
Antitrust may have a more important role to play when older
technologies that have an entrenched position confront new technologies,
including internet technologies. The concerns have been raised with
respect to ultimately unsuccessful proposed mergers between Comcast
Cable and Time-Warner Cable, as well as the successful merger between
AT&T and DirecTV, a satellite provider.182 These proposed mergers
involve both old technology cable companies and relatively new
technology ISPs. Internet “on demand” programming is increasingly
displacing traditional hard-wired cable television delivered with
scheduled programs.183 The switch away from cable is particularly
prominent among younger viewers.184 The market is currently in flux and
non-cable alternatives are increasing rapidly. In January 2015, ESPN and
Dish Network announced a standalone internet streaming service that will
permit people with broadband to receive channels on the Internet

Statement_on_Open_Internet_Order_FINAL_1.pdf (mocking the FCC’s regulation by dating the
article 1934 and implying the new regulation is something from the 1930s).
181. 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶¶ 240–241 (4th ed.
2014). On the role of antitrust, see FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 178, at 6 n.12 (“[T]his
Order need not conclude that any specific market power exists in the hands of one or more
broadband providers in order to create and enforce these rules. Thus, these rules do not address,
and are not designed to deal with, the acquisition or maintenance of market power or its abuse,
real or potential. Moreover, it is worth noting that the Commission acts in a manner that is both
complementary to the work of the antitrust agencies and supported by their application of antitrust
laws. Nothing in this Order in any way precludes the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice or the Commission itself from fulfilling their respective responsibilities under Section 7
of the Clayton Act, or the Commission’s public interest standard as it assesses prospective
transactions.” (citations omitted)).
182. See Thomas Gryta & Shalini Ramachandran, FCC Delays Reviews of Two Big Mergers,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2015, at B4. The Comcast and Time-Warner cable merger was not
successful. Roger Yu & Mike Snider, How Comcast, Time Warner Cable Deal Unraveled, USA
TODAY (Apr. 25, 2015, 12:27 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/04/24/howcomcast-deal-to-buy-time-warner-cable-fell-apart/26313471/ (providing explanations for why
the Time Warner board voted against the deal). AT&T and DirecTV, however, were successful
in their merger. Roger Yu, FCC Approves AT&T’s Acquisition of DirecTV, USA TODAY (July 27,
2015,
10:01
AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/07/24/fcc-approves-tsacquisition-directv/30626421/.
183. Jeffrey Prince & Shane M. Greenstein, Measuring Consumer Preferences for Video
Content Provision Via Cord-Cutting Behavior 2 (Telecomm. Policy Research Conference
Working Paper No. 41, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2241680.
184. See id. at 13, 37–38 tbl.2.
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directly.185 This move will almost certainly hasten the migration away
from traditional cable toward internet-based television services.186
Others, including Sony, HBO, and Apple, have already announced entry
in more limited ways or are contemplating it.187 At this writing, the FCC
has proposed de-linking of cable set-top boxes from cable service. Delinking will enable the use of “generic” tuner boxes that can serve to make
cable video more readily interchangeable, and thus competitive, with
non-cable video.188
Cable companies have not only been laggards in internet service
development, but they have also resisted internet alternatives at both the
program-content and service-provision levels, in the process restraining
innovation significantly. The rationale is not difficult to discern: the
Internet is, or can be, both more efficient and more competitive than cable
technology. The fear, expressed in Netflix’s forceful opposition to the
Comcast merger,189 is that cable television companies will either cap
internet bandwidth or price it out in a way that makes Netflix and other
internet content streamers more costly.190 The issue is complex, however.
On the one hand, cable companies may not obtain as much revenue from
internet data streaming as they do from carrying programs themselves.
On the other hand, consumers typically pay an extra fee for their internet
access anyway, and sometimes this fee is quite large in relation to the
bandwidth that they obtain.191
185. Emily Steel, Dish Network Unveils Sling TV, a Streaming Service to Rival Cable (and
It Has ESPN), N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/business/
media/dish-network-announces-web-based-pay-tv-offering.html.
186. See id.
187. See HBO NOW, http://order.hbonow.com/ (describing internet-only service limited to
HBO programming); Angela Moscaritolo, Sony Gearing Up for Official Playstation Vue Launch,
PC MAG (Mar. 12, 2015, 2:10 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2478204,00.asp
(describing the cable alternative available to PlayStation users); Emily Steel & Brian X. Chen,
Apple Said to Plan Limited, Low-Cost Streaming Service, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/18/business/media/apple-said-to-plan-limited-low-cost-stream
ing-service.html (describing Apple’s potential range of programing from different networks).
188. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In re Expanding Consumers’ Video Navigation
Choices, FCC 16-18 (Feb. 18, 2016), 2016 WL 759903 (F.C.C.), http://transition.fcc.gov/
Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2016/db0218/FCC-16-18A1.pdf.
189. Cecilia Kang, Netflix Opposes Comcast’s Merger with Time Warner Cable, Calls It
Anticompetitive, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2014/04/21/netflix-opposes-comcasts-merger-with-time-warner-cable-calls-it-anticomp
etitive (discussing Netflix’s opposition to the Comcast–Time Warner merger).
190. See id.; cf. C. Robert Gibson, How a Mid-Sized Tennessee Town Took on Comcast,
HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (May 6, 2015, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carlgibson/chattanooga-socialism_b_6812368.html (providing an interesting account of one conflict
in Chattanooga, Tennessee).
191. See Roger Yu, Cable Companies Cap Data Use for Revenue, USA TODAY (Oct. 1, 2012,
7:13
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2012/10/01/internet-data-cap/1595683/
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The other significant competitive threat is upstream, in the internet
service provision market. In the United States, several cable companies
offer broadband internet services, but they have resisted the deployment
of greater bandwidth.192 Google, AT&T, and several smaller firms are
now installing ultra-high-speed Internet in many communities.193
However, this Internet is typically not tied to a cable television company
at all, although it may be bundled with satellite television.
The upstream situation is somewhat precarious for cable companies
because the range and robustness of alternatives is growing larger.
Depending on available alternatives, viewers faced with limitations on
internet speed or access offered by a cable company may simply drop
cable altogether and make a different deal for internet service
provision.194 Nevertheless, large cable companies continue to have a
dominant market share in many areas,195 and they can be expected to
resist the fastest and least restricted internet options as long as these large
cable companies challenge traditional cable profits. At the same time,
however, the business model of the cable companies can be expected to
change.196 How quickly that happens depends on the extent of
competition.
In any event, regulatory alternatives other than antitrust are better
suited to addressing most of these problems. As far as antitrust is
concerned, even a monopolist can generally charge any price or regulate
the quality of its output, provided that it does so unilaterally and does not
unreasonably exclude rivals. While cable companies may be holding back
on internet speed, that is not an antitrust violation in and of itself.
Exclusionary practices directed at competitors can be, however. Further,
a merger between a cable television provider and an existing broadband
company could prove anticompetitive if it threatened to restrain
innovation in the broadband market. Additionally, holding back on
otherwise available higher speeds could certainly qualify, provided that
(discussing increasingly expensive data caps employed by Comcast and Time Warner).
192. See id.
193. E.g., Mike Freeman, AT&T Working on Ultra High Speed Internet, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIBUNE (Apr. 21, 2014, 5:07 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2014/apr/21/
AT-and-T-high-speed-Internet-DSL-Reports-Google/; Milo Medin, Ultra High-Speed
Broadband Is Coming to Kansas City, Kansas, GOOGLE BLOG (Mar. 30, 2011, 4:15 PM),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/ultra-high-speed-broadband-is-coming-to.html.
194. Prince & Greenstein, supra note 183, at 2, 4.
195. See Research and Markets: USA—Digital TV Market—Broadcasting and IPTV, BUS.
WIRE (Mar. 22, 2011, 1:20 PM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20110322006178/
en/Research-Markets-USA---Digital-TV-Market#.Vglco9iFPcs.
196. See Ben Popper, The Great Unbundling: Cable TV as We Know It Is Dying, VERGE
(Apr. 22, 2015, 10:34 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2015/4/22/8466845/cable-tv-unbundlingverizon-espn-apple.
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other market conditions for competitive harm were present. The 2010
Federal Horizontal Merger Guidelines discuss such possibilities in a
section covering mergers that limit “Innovation and Product Variety.”197
One of the more harmful sets of regulatory initiatives, rarely reflecting
anything more than special interest capture, is efforts at both the federal
and state levels to prevent municipalities from creating or expanding their
own broadband services by contracting with third parties such as Google
for installation.198 The anti-municipal expansion program gained political
momentum in 2004 when the Supreme Court held that federal law did not
preempt state statutes that limited the power of municipalities to develop
their own telecommunications services.199 The result was accelerated
efforts by cable and existing telephone companies to campaign to state
legislatures for such statutes, and approximately twenty states have
passed them.200
The general thrust of these statutes is to prohibit municipalities from
taking greater technological advantage of what the Internet has to offer in
situations where existing ISPs have been laggards.201 These municipally
contracted networks are largely, although not entirely, independent of
content.202 As a result, they do not have a significant incentive to
discriminate against or otherwise hinder competing programing. The
municipal systems can also provide collateral services such as free Wi-Fi
in designated downtown areas, city parks, public libraries, other public
buildings, and even subways and buses.203 At the same time, it is not
difficult to see why major cable companies have launched a fierce
lobbying campaign against the expansion of municipal broadband. First
of all, the addition of a municipal alternative increases broadband
197. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 65, § 6.4. The 2010
Guidelines also state in the opening section that “[a] merger enhances market power if it is likely
to encourage one or more firms to raise price, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise
harm customers as a result of diminished competitive constraints or incentives.” Id. at § 1; see 4
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 900.1c (2015 Supp.).
198. See John Blevins, Death of the Revolution: The Legal War on Competitive Broadband
Technologies, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 85, 107–15 (2009) (accounting developments up to its time
of publication).
199. See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 128–29 (2004).
200. See SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AND MONOPOLY
POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 255–56 (2013).
201. See id.
202. One exception is Google Fiber, because Google owns YouTube, but at least as of this
writing, it does not seem to be discriminating against alternative program providers. Behind the
Scenes with Google Fiber: Working with Content Providers to Minimize Buffering, GOOGLE FIBER
BLOG (May 21, 2014), http://googlefiberblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/minimizing-buffering.html.
203. See, e.g., Elissa Vallano, The Five Best Cities for Free Public WiFi, MY CITY WAY
(Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.mycityway.com/blog/2011/08/17/the-five-best-cities-for-freepublic-wifi-2/.
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competition.204 Second, because they are not affiliated with cable
companies or content providers, the municipal companies lack the
incentives that have distorted or hindered broadband development.205
To be sure, municipal overinvestment or under-delivery can be a
problem.206 Further, overly subsidized municipal broadband may
compete unfairly with existing broadband suppliers.207 This is most likely
to be a problem when the broadband market in an area is competitive to
begin with. Municipalities compete with private enterprise all the time in
the provision of parking, local transportation, waste disposal, firefighting,
electricity, and even education and hospitals.208 One important difference
between many of these services is that, unlike broadband, they are much
more likely to be competitively provided to begin with, reducing the need
for a municipal market entrant. In any event, to the extent these problems
exist, legislation requiring municipal broadband projects to be fiscally
responsible is the better away to address them. The benefits of increased
broadband entry by non-vertically integrated suppliers of any kind,
including municipal, certainly outweigh costs.
Here again, antitrust’s role is limited. As a general proposition, the
source of the restraint is legislative. As the Supreme Court has recently
re-emphasized, even state legislation can be subject to antitrust scrutiny
when it gives too much authority to interested market participants whom
a public official inadequately supervised209 or when it fails to authorize
specific anticompetitive acts.210 By and large, however, absolute
prohibitions passed by state legislation do not fall into these categories.
Rather, combatting anticompetitive efforts to restrain municipal internet
provision falls more clearly into the FCC’s mandate to further the public
interest in internet development, which in this case should preempt
practices that restrain either output or innovation.

204. See Joshua J. Romero, FCC Gives Municipal Broadband Providers (and Internet
Competition) a Boost, IEEE SPECTRUM (Feb. 26, 2015, 6:37 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/techtalk/telecom/internet/municipal-broadband-providers-and-internet-competition-get-a-boost.
205. See id.
206. See Michael O’Reilly, Comm’r, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks at the American
Enterprise Institute Luncheon (Jan. 21, 2014).
207. Id.
208. Dennis A. Rondinelli, Partnering for Development: Government—Private Sector
Cooperation in Service Provision, in REINVENTING GOVERNMENT FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: STATE CAPACITY IN A GLOBALIZING SOCIETY 219, 219 (Dennis A. Rondinelli & G.
Shabbir Cheema eds., 2003).
209. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1111
(2015).
210. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1007 (2013).
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V. ANTITRUST AND PATENTS IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES
Today, many view the patent system as not working. Common
criticisms are that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issues far too
many patents and that discerning patent validity and scope is extremely
costly and produces uncertain results.211 These critiques are hardly new,
and even Supreme Court Justices asserted some of them more than a
century ago.212 The concerns are not evenly arrayed across all industries,
however. In some markets, such as chemical production and pioneer
pharmaceuticals, the patent system works relatively well.213 In others,
including electronics, software, and most information technologies, it
works very poorly.214
In information technologies, the more controversial patent and
competition issues concern standard setting, FRAND royalty obligations,
the right to an injunction on FRAND-encumbered patents,215 software
and business method patents, as well as issues related to cross-licensing
or package licensing. These issues often arise in technologies relating to
the creation, formatting, dissemination, and consumption of digital
information. One important reason is the crucial importance of
networking in information technologies, which demands interoperability,
and thus technological compatibility, among the devices and programs of
different competitors.
The extent to which antitrust law should address these problems in
addition to or instead of patent law has been controversial. To begin with,
it is not the purpose of antitrust law to repair defects in other federal
government regulatory systems, including the patent system.216 For most
abuses, the patent system itself is quite capable of keeping its house in
order. The Patent Act governs all questions about patent validity, scope,
and infringement, as well as most questions about improper litigation

211. E.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK, 120–121 (2008); BOHANNAN &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 129, at xi.
212. E.g., David J. Brewer, The Patent System, 3 YALE L.J. 149, 149, 151 (1894) (“[S]o many
worthless patents have been issued, suggest[ing] that perhaps the machinery now in use may not
be the one adapted to work out the best results.”); see HOVENKAMP, OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW,
supra note 145, at 184–205.
213. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 211, at 88–89.
214. Id. at 89; see also Alan Devlin, Antitrust Limits on Targeted Patent Aggregation, 67
FLA. L. REV. 775, 779 (2015) (arguing that antitrust laws can limit abuses of the patent system).
215. See discussion infra Section V.A.
216. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 76 OHIO ST.
L.J. 467, 475 (2015) (viewing antitrust and patent systems as two separate regulatory institutions,
each with its own principal purpose to correct market failures within their respective institution).
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conduct.217 Questions about entitlement to an injunction for patent
infringement or the mechanism for computing royalties are also
fundamentally about patent law or even contract law, not antitrust.218
On the other hand, the patent system does not have satisfactory tools
for permitting consumer or end-user challenges to harmful patent
practices. Infringement defendants, who are almost always producers,
can litigate questions about patent validity and scope as well as
overclaiming or litigation misconduct, and they do so all the time.
Nothing in the Patent Act, however, gives consumers a general right to
challenge such practices. When consumers do obtain such rights, it is
most typically under antitrust laws, which permit consumers to challenge
anticompetitive practices that raise prices or reduce product quality.219
For example, while only patent infringement defendants can challenge
improper infringement actions directly under the Patent Act—then only
by a defense, counterclaim, or request for attorney’s fees—consumers
can bring an action under antitrust laws for improper infringement actions
that result in monopoly and higher prices.220
What makes the consumer-action feature of antitrust law particularly
important is that consumer welfare is just as central to good IP policy as
to good competition policy. Consumers consistently benefit from
innovation that reduces costs or improves product or service quality.221
As a result, they are the optimal surrogates for patent efficiency. The story
for producers is more ambiguous. Producers certainly benefit from their
own innovation as well from complementary innovations that they can
procure from others. However, they can also benefit from practices that
217. The Patent Act’s “exceptional case” provision authorizes judges to discipline improper
litigation conduct by assessing attorney’s fees against the offender. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012); see
also Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014) (making
it easier for federal judges to assess such penalties).
218. E.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006) (applying patent
law to a patent infringement case in which the court considered permanent injunctions).
219. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (allowing “any person” injured by an antitrust violation to seek
treble damages); see also 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 303d
(4th ed. 2014) (describing treble damages as a form of punishment for the defendant’s violation);
2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ROGER D. BLAIR & CHRISTINE PIETTE DURRANCE,
ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 330 (4th ed. 2014) (same).
220. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965)
(reasoning that a patent infringement lawsuit based on a fraudulently obtained patent could
constitute an antitrust violation in a counterclaim brought by infringement defendant); Ritz
Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 508 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (recognizing a
distinction drawn by Walker Process between claims that arise under antitrust laws and those that
arise under patent laws); In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 690–91
(2d Cir. 2009) (describing Walker Process standing).
221. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Consumer Welfare in Competition and Intellectual Property
Law, 9 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 53, 59 (2013).
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restrain the competing innovations of other firms or that permit them to
profit from the assertion of legal rights that confer no social benefit
whatsoever.222 In sum, consumers are inherently better plaintiffs for
enforcing IP rights, just as they are for enforcing antitrust law. No good
institutional mechanism for consumer involvement exists in IP law.
Another advantage of antitrust policy for evaluating patent practices
is its economic, ex ante approach to decision-making. In a welcome
development, the Supreme Court’s 2013 Actavis decision recognized that
courts can address some restraints of trade governing patents without
addressing issues of patent validity or scope.223 Antitrust’s economic
approach to restraints creates appropriate incentives by relying on
rational expectations about consequences to guide people’s behavior at
the time they contemplate it.224 Thus, the antitrust consequences of a
settlement should be based on what the parties reasonably believed about
patent validity and infringement at the time they entered into their
settlement225 and on objective indicators about competitive effects. To be
useful policy, policy makers must attach incentives to behavior at the time
the parties contemplate the behavior.
When it comes to assessing the competitive effects of patent practices,
antitrust law has some distinct comparative advantages over patent law.
Industrial economists have been studying the effects of industry practices
on output and competitiveness for decades. By contrast, neither economic
scholarship nor congressional or other government fact-finding has
produced much useful information about how patent issuance, duration,
scope, or enforcement affect economic welfare. In that state of affairs, it
is hardly clear that competition policy should be yielding much territory
to patent policy.226
A. Standard Setting and FRAND Encumbered Patents
“FRAND” refers to a patentee’s contract or contract-like obligation to
license one or more of its patents on “fair, reasonable and
222. See id. at 61.
223. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013); see Aaron Edlin,
Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Activating Actavis, 28 ANTITRUST 16, 19
(2013) (understanding Actavis as granting a trial court power “to limit evidence on the validity
and scope of the patent and to only hear evidence to the extent that it is highly probative in
establishing whether there was ‘payment for delay’”); Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert
Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Actavis and Error Costs, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2014, at 1, 1–2.
224. See Edlin et al., supra note 79, at 606.
225. Id. at 617.
226. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason and the Scope of the Patent, 52 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 515 (2015); Herbert Hovenkamp, Institutional Advantage in Competition and Innovation
Policy 1 (Univ. Iowa Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 13-43, 2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2307141.
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nondiscriminatory” terms.227 Such agreements most generally arise in the
context of standard-setting organizations (SSOs), particularly in
industries such as digital video technology or cellular phones, 228 where
compatibility and the ability to interconnect are essential. An SSO is
typically created to identify and adopt standards for technology in such
industries that enable the devices of various manufacturers to function on
a single network.229 A multi-producer market such as the ones for cellular
phones or digital video could not exist without such standards.230
Frequently, an SSO will have several choices of technologies to
address a particular problem or provide a new feature to the community
of producers adopting its standards. At that point, the SSO may ask the
owners of these technologies to “bid” for the right to have their
technology adopted as a standard.231 Part of this bid is a FRAND
commitment. This means that the technology owner agrees in advance
that if its technology is adopted as the standard, it will license the
technology to all users on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory
terms.232 Once the technology is selected, two things happen. First, the
chosen technology becomes much more valuable in the marketplace.
Prior to selection, the technology was perhaps one of many options and
had to vie with others, perhaps even unpatented public domain
alternatives. Once selection occurs, however, all manufacturers on the
network that want to take advantage of that technology will use the one
that has been selected. By contrast, unselected technologies generally
become less valuable. Some may even become worthless, particularly if
they were dedicated to a single use for which there is no longer a market.
As a result, rejection of a particular technology has produced some
antitrust challenges by disappointed owners.233
The winning patents that constitute the selected technology (now
called “standard-essential patents” or SEPs) become “FRANDencumbered,” which means that anyone can license them on FRAND

227. Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 39, 39 (2015). For a
good introduction to FRAND commitments and the surrounding issues, see generally Thomas F.
Cotter, Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND Royalties,
22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 311 (2014).
228. See Cotter, supra note 227, at 311–13 (discussing the connection between FRAND
agreements and the Mobile Devices Patent Wars).
229. See id. at 311–12.
230. Herbert Hovenkamp, Competition in Information Technologies: Standards-Essential
Patents, Non-Practicing Entities, and FRAND Bidding 6 (Univ. Iowa Legal Stud. Research Paper
No. 12-32, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154203.
231. Id. at 7.
232. Id.
233. E.g., Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 269–70 (5th Cir. 2008).
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terms234 The meaning of FRAND encumbrance has led to several
litigation issues, a few of which are relevant to competition policy. One
has to do with whether the owner of a FRAND-encumbered patent is
entitled to obtain an injunction against a user or, relatedly, the
circumstances under which such an injunction is appropriate.235 The
second has to do with how a fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory
royalty obligation is computed.236
U.S. law generally limits antitrust to a fairly restricted domain.
Therefore, most courts view these problems as presenting issues of patent
law or sometimes contract law, not antitrust law. This includes questions
about whether the owner of a FRAND-encumbered patent is entitled to
an injunction. The principal exception permitting application of antitrust
law in U.S. courts is for firms that make legal claims that are so poorly
founded that the firms have no reasonable expectation of winning.237 But
most claims for an injunction on a FRAND-encumbered patent have not
fallen into this category. In 2014, a decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit split three ways on this issue,238 indicating that any
of three different positions on it is reasonable. Judge Randall Rader, at
that time the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, wrote in dissent that the
owner of a FRAND-encumbered patent should be able to obtain an
injunction on the same terms as any other patentee.239 Most of the
important decisions, such as eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C.,240 which
rejected the rule of virtually automatic injunctions against patent

234. See Cotter, supra note 227, at 311–12; Hovenkamp, supra note 230, at 7–8.
235. Hovenkamp, supra note 230, at 14.
236. Cotter, supra note 227, at 356–59; Hovenkamp, supra note 230, at 9–12.
237. E.g., Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 51
(1993) (affirming the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the lawsuit was
immune from an antitrust challenge unless the litigation was “objectively baseless”); see also 3
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 706 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing
the baselessness standard).
238. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that
Motorola is not entitled to an injunction and reasoning that an injunction may be appropriate
“where an infringer unilaterally refuses a FRAND royalty”), overruled on other grounds by
Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015); id. (Rader, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that the district court gave FRAND encumbrance too much weight and that a dispute of
material fact existed as to Apple’s unwillingness to license); id. at 1334 (Prost, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing that an alleged infringer’s refusal to enter into a licensing agreement justifies an
injunction but agreeing that FRAND encumbrance should be a factor in injunction analysis).
239. See id. at 1333–34 (Rader, C.J., dissenting).
240. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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infringers,241 and the recent round of FRAND cases,242 are not antitrust
cases at all.
This does not mean that antitrust can never have a role. First of all, a
lawsuit in conflict with the plaintiff’s own contractual obligations could
be improper, and to that extent could result in antitrust liability. The Ninth
Circuit made that clear in its Apple v. Motorola decision, citing several
cases.243 That fact does not necessarily mean, however, that antitrust is
the best vehicle for pursuing such claims. While filing of a baseless,
exclusionary lawsuit satisfies the conduct element of a monopolization
offense, liability also requires proof of monopoly power or a dangerous
probability of achieving it. The Patent Act’s own remedial measures such
as the “exceptional case” provision, would provide a more direct route to
relief, although not treble damages.244 Of course, the contractual
obligations to license on FRAND terms would have to be sufficiently
clear.
One might imagine a conspiracy among owners of FRANDencumbered patents to deny relief, or a conspiracy among producers to
deny a firm’s application for a standard in order to protect their own
technologies.245 But fundamental questions about the meaning and scope
of FRAND status is a question of patent law, not of antitrust. By contrast,
EU competition law reaches further. The Court of Justice of the European
Union has held that the owner of a FRAND-encumbered patent may
abuse its dominant position unlawfully under Article 102 when it requests
an injunction as a way of forcing a royalty agreement.246
B. Patent Pooling and Related Technology Sharing
In patent law, a “pool” refers to a situation in which two or more firms
share a technology via common licensing.247 For example, if two
241. Id. at 394 (holding that it is within the discretion of the district courts to grant or deny
injunctive relief).
242. E.g., Apple, 757 F.3d at 1332 (majority opinion); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696
F.3d 872, 885 (9th Cir. 2012); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1193–94
(W.D. Wash. 2013).
243. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1047 (9th Cir. 2015) (no immunity
for lawsuits that are in breach of contract); accord Powertech Tech., Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 872 F.
Supp. 2d 924, 931 (N.D. Cal 2012); Spear Pharm., Inc. v. William Blair & Co., 610 F. Supp. 2d
278, 288 (D. Del. 2009).
244. See supra text accompanying note 217.
245. E.g., Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2008)
(rejecting such a claim).
246. Case C-170/13, Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 E.C.R.,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=165911&doclang=EN.
247. Erik N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Patent Pools and Related Technology
Sharing (Cambridge University Press Antitrust Intellectual Property and High Tech Handbook,
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television manufacturers each own some patents that give their own
televisions desirable features, they may cross-license, thus enabling both
manufacturers to share these features.248 Such sharing generally improves
consumer welfare to the extent that the features are desirable and can be
distributed across the entire market.249 Because patents are non-rivalrous,
desirable features can be duplicated an infinite number of times. If the
two firms have patent portfolios of roughly equal value, then the crosslicensing might be royalty free; if not, then one firm may pay the other a
royalty.250
The firms may also agree about whether to license their shared
technology to outside firms. Some pools are composed entirely of patent
portfolio owners who share their technology with one another. Often,
however, a large pool will have both “licensor members,” who
manufacture and submit their patents to the pool for licensing, and
“licensee members,” who manufacture one or more products but do not
have patents of their own to license to the pool. A good example of such
a large pool is MPEG-LA, which has collected thousands of patents
related to digital video technology and freely licenses them to
outsiders.251
Our understanding of the economic rationale for and competitive
effects of patent pools has evolved considerably. Today it seems clear
that the rationales for pooling in networked information intensive
technologies are different from the rationales in more traditional
technologies. In a technologically simpler time, the most common
explanations were that pools were procompetitive if the patents in the
pool were complements to one another but that they were likely to be
anticompetitive when patents competed.252 When two things are
complements, such as hardware and software, they are efficiently used
Roger C. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol, eds., 2016) (forthcoming), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2645905); 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 2043, at 283.
248. See id.
249. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 57 (2007).
250. Id. at 61 & n.17.
251. MPEG-LA’s website lists both its licensor members and its licensee members. E.g.,
MPEG-2
Licensees,
MPEG LA,
http://www.mpegla.com/main/programs/M2/pages/
Licensees.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2016); MPEG-2 Licensors, MPEG LA,
http://www.mpegla.com/main/programs/M2/Pages/Licensors.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2016); see
also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 249, at 68–69 (describing the
MPEG-2 pool).
252. See Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution, 2004
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶ 5 (suggesting that patents that are not substitutes do not necessarily raise
competition concerns); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Efficient Patent Pools, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 691,
692 (2004) (noting that while patents are rarely perfect complements or perfect substitutes,
generally perfect complements raise welfare, and perfect substitutes harm welfare).
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together. By contrast, a user selects one among several competing
products. At the atmospheric level, this view of patent pools makes
economic sense. For example, if a manufacturer of digital memory
devices and another manufacturer of digital displays should pool their
patents, each might more efficiently be able to produce a device such as
a laptop computer that included both memory and a display. On the other
hand, if two patentees of duplicate technology should pool, the rationale
is more likely to be price fixing.253 A licensee would need technology
from one of them but not both, and the pool may serve as a price
agreement device.
This rationale fails to explain the phenomenon of the widespread
pooling of complex digital technologies. Several other characteristics of
these markets must be considered as well. First, information technology
patents are frequently complex and involve many claims. As a result, they
often function as both market substitutes and complements, making this
distinction less defensible.254 A good illustration is the Federal Circuit’s
2010 Princo Corp. v. International Trade Commission255 decision. The
pooling in that case involved rewritable DVDs, and the problem in
controversy involved patented technologies for locating the electronic
“stylus” in such a way that it could begin recording precisely where it left
off in a previous recording session.256 One firm had developed and
patented an analog technology for solving this problem, while the other
had developed a digital alternative.257 Critics regarded the digital
technology as technologically superior, but it was also less stable and
somewhat buggy.258 As a result, manufacturers preferred the analog
technology for the time being. In the devices, the two technologies
functioned as substitutes rather than complements. A manufacturer would
ordinarily require one or the other but not both. In Princo, however,
practicing the analog technology required infringement of at least one
claim in the digital patent as well.259 In sum, even though the two
technologies appeared to be substitutes in the product market, the patents
functioned as legal complements to the extent that a firm wishing to use
the analog technology had to obtain a license for both.

253. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 249, at 74.
254. See id.
255. 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); see Christina Bohannan & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Concerted Refusals to License Intellectual Property, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. BULL.
21, 21–22 (2011).
256. Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 255, at 22.
257. Princo, 616 F.3d at 1322.
258. Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 255, at 22.
259. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

43

Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 9

462

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

The complement–substitute distinction is not a particularly strong
explanation for pooling in complex information technology markets.
Indeed, a large pool such as MPEG-LA contains thousands of patents
whose functional relationship to one another is as both complements and
substitutes, as well as many patents whose precise scope has never been
determined.260
Further, the question of whether patents operate as substitutes,
complements, or neither can be quite specific to the particular licensee.
To illustrate, the patents in the MPEG-LA pool relate to digital video
technology that operates under a common standard.261 The devices that
employ this technology include generators of digital video content, such
as cameras and video cameras. But they also include devices that accept
digital content generated elsewhere and process it, including displays,
storage devices, compilers, editors, and the like. The users also include
software that reads and processes digital video content while neither
producing nor displaying it. A device such as a smartphone might
perform several or even all of these functions, while a device such as a
computer monitor (display only) or camera (generation only) performs
only a few.
In such markets, the distinction between complementary and
substitute patents is largely meaningless. Rather, pooling functions as a
mechanism for managing communal ownership when sharing property
rights is less costly and more effective than defending individual
boundaries.262 That is to say, the modern digital pool operates more like
a common pool resource frequently used in old-fashioned markets such
as fisheries, livestock grazing, or irrigation.263
Why might the several rights owners of a fishing lake “pool” their
rights, giving each member access to all, rather than attempting to divide
the lake into individual sectors permitting each one to appropriate its own
investment? First, identifying, setting, and defending boundaries can be
very costly. Second, dividing the territory in this way could be
devastating to the yield.
On the first issue, information technology patents are often
characterized by ambiguous claim drafting that makes interpretation
costly, often on the order of several thousand dollars per patent, and in
260. MPEG-LA states that it controls more than 5000 patents. A History of Success—A
Future in Innovation, MPEG LA, http://www.mpegla.com/main/Pages/AboutHistory.aspx (last
visited Apr. 4, 2016).
261. See id.
262. See Hovenkamp, supra note 104, at 1130.
263. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 18–22 (James E. Ault & Douglass C. North eds., 1990)
(using an inshore fishery in Alanya, Turkey as an example of pooling functions).
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situations where often dozens or even hundreds of patents are in issue.264
By simply cross-licensing their portfolios or licensing them in the
aggregate to manufacturing licensees, the firms can eliminate most of the
costly problems that accompany individual patent interpretation.265 Once
they have licensed out everything they own, they have no motive for
ascertaining which of their many patents a licensee might be using. This
is simply a special, although perhaps not widely appreciated, application
of Ronald Coase’s well-known article, The Nature of the Firm.266 Coase
argued that the firm’s continuous comparison of the costs of doing
something for itself against those of using the market determine the
boundaries of a firm.267 In this case, the cost of maintaining individual
boundaries exceeds the cost of sharing and then managing the shared
resources. A firm that is intent on maximizing its profits will choose the
marginally less costly alternative.
Patent pools in digital technologies have raised some antitrust
problems, although surprisingly few given the amount of power that the
larger pools have. Price-fixing or express output-limitation agreements in
product markets could certainly provoke antitrust challenges, but such
restrictions are uncommon.268 One important difference between
traditional common pool resources and patent pools is that the resources
in a traditional commons, such as a fishery, are rivalrous or
“subtractive.”269 That is, each member’s use reduces the amount left over
for others.270 Further, overuse is an important problem given that
individual members do not bear the full cost of resource development.
For example, overfishing in fishery commons is to be expected because
each member has an incentive to put in as little as possible while taking
out as much as possible. For this reason, catch or related use limitations
will almost certainly be necessary.271 There is nothing suspicious about
an agreement among ten members of a fishery commons to limit each
264. See, e.g., Nero AG v. MPEG LA, L.L.C., No. 10-cv-3672-MRP-RZ, 2010 WL 4878835,
at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2010) (alleging that it would cost licensee $7 million to determine which
patents it would need to license from MPEG); see also Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d
709, 718–19 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., concurring) (discussing high costs of claim
construction); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1475–76 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader,
J., dissenting) (noting the high costs and reversal rates of claim construction), abrogation
recognized by Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
265. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 249, at 57.
266. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
267. BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 129, at 331; see Coase, supra note 266, at 390–
92.
268. One good historical example, which condemned product price fixing, is United States
v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 312–14 (1948).
269. BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 129, at 328.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 332–33.
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person’s catch to, say, 100 fish per week.272
In contrast, IP rights are non-rivalrous. One person’s use of a patent
does nothing to diminish the quantity left over. As a result, jointly agreed
output limitations by the members of a patent pool are inherently more
suspicious and should be reviewed for the possibility of price fixing.273
Most of the antitrust challenges to patent pools in information
technologies have not involved price fixing but rather tying or equivalent
claims. For example, the licensee from a large patent pool might
complain about being required to take the entire pool of, say, 1200 patents
when it believes that its own product infringes no more than a small
fraction of that number. For example, Nero AG, an unsuccessful
challenger to the MPEG pool, is a software company whose products
customers use for photo and video editing but not for creating new
content or displaying it.274 Claims such as Nero’s made some sense in a
time when the substitutes–complements distinction was the ruling
rationale for pooling. By stating that a particular patent was not wanted,
the licensee was in fact asserting that this particular patent was not a
complementary technology insofar as the licensee’s own production was
concerned. If it were, the licensee would presumably want it.
But the substitute–complement distinction rarely serves to justify the
existence of large patent pools in information technologies. The more
central problem is the cost of determining the scope of each patent as well
as of examining the licensee’s products and determining which of the
pool’s many patents the devices infringe. Those costs could easily exceed
the costs of the licensing agreement itself, which is of course why the
patents were licensed in this fashion in the first place. Indeed, when
extended over the entire range of licensees, the cost of examining all of
the patents and determining which ones every licensee’s products
infringed would be heroic. If doing this were efficient, pooling would not
be expected to exist in the first place.
CONCLUSION
Digital and other information technologies have presented public and
private antitrust plaintiffs with daunting challenges. These include the
assessment of market power as well as understanding both unilateral and
collaborative activity. In the process, the case law and literature have both
understated and exaggerated competitive problems.

272. See id.
273. Id. at 333.
274. See Nero AG v. MPEG LA, L.L.C., No. 10-cv-3672-MRP-RZ, 2010 WL 4366448, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2010); News Release, MPEG LA, MPEG LA, Nero Settle Litigation 2
(Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.mpegla.com/Lists/MPEG%20LA%20Legal%20Action%20List/
Attachments/47/n-12-04-12.pdf.
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There is little reason for thinking that competition cannot work in
most markets involving digital and other information technologies.
Nevertheless, effective policy design requires careful thought. The trick
is to keep the channels open for new entry, resource movement, and
consumer choice—things that antitrust policy is capable of doing well. IP
rights must be respected, but too often they hinder rather than facilitate
the free flow of information. Antitrust and the competition economics
that guide it have the advantage of good empirical tools and a rich dataset,
as well as judicially directed policy goals that are aligned with the
consumer welfare interests in both competition and innovation. At the
same time, however, antitrust’s domain is limited. First, it requires more
than a practice that simply reduces economic welfare. There must also be
harm to competition. Finally, courts never intended antitrust to be a tool
for policing the behavior of other federal regulatory regimes, although it
does have some limited power to police insufficiently transparent
regulation imposed by the states.
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